

JULY 17, 2006

The American Conservative

PETROCRACY

How Oil Drives the
U.S. War Machine

Kevin Phillips

BUSH'S SECRET VETO

James Bovard

PEACE IN THE CULTURE WAR?


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FOR THE RECORD

I must break my custom of never replying to any review of a book I have written ("A Tale of Two Tyrants," July 3). In this case I must express my high appreciation and gratitude for Professor Lee Congdon's protracted interest in my work.

But I must correct this very important statement, not about my book but about my life: "Lukacs had always been grateful to the Red Army and to all those who helped to destroy the Third Reich... Lukacs left Hungary in 1946, two years before the Hungarian Stalinists consolidated their power—hence while he experienced Nazi tyranny he did not suffer communist dictatorship." Exactly the opposite happened. I fled Hungary in 1946 because I was convinced that the Russians would continue to stay there, and that therefore Communists would be more and more powerful. I had nothing but contempt or, more precisely, disdain for Communists and Communism throughout my entire life. The fate of Hungary and of Eastern Europe was determined not by Communism but by the Russian armed presence. How could I have been "always"(!) grateful to the Red Army? This is a thoroughly wrong attribution of motives, without a speck of evidence in any of my writings (besides being entirely irrelevant to my *June 1941* book).

JOHN LUKACS
Phoenixville, Pa.

Lee Congdon replies

John Lukacs knows of my respect for him and for his work. I regret if I misrepresented any of his views. There can be no question concerning his disdain for Communism, but I do not think he will deny that he believes anticommunism to have done more historic damage.

I know why he left Hungary; my point was that he did not, as a result of that decision, experience Stalinist dictatorship. I know too that it was the Red Army, not the appeal of Communism, that maintained Rákosi in power. But it was Communists, not Red Army officers, who organized the despotism.

Finally, Professor Lukacs has made no secret of his gratitude to those—especially Churchill—who helped destroy the Third Reich. In the penultimate sentence of this book he writes of the strange fact "that the greatest instrument of the retribution of Germany and of the end of Hitler was Stalin's Red Army." Are we to find no gratitude in this sentence?

SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL

As Peter Wood describes his annual pilgrimage to the Parmenter gravesite in "Monumental Mistakes" (July 3), the simple beauty of that experience speaks with much greater moral clarity than does the nearly \$1 billion World Trade Center Memorial.

By designing an imposing structure at Ground Zero, we memorialize the spite of the living rather than the value of the dead. A memorial, it seems to me, is effective only if it guides you beyond yourself and connects you to someone since departed. If the locus of attention lies with the living, particularly emphasizing our desire to "get even" by grandiose architecture, we have turned our grief into folly (the lack of character) rather than wisdom (the application of character). Rather than kid ourselves that this billion-dollar expense in lower Manhattan is a memorial to those who perished, let's at least be honest about what sadly it has turned out to be: a public oath for vengeance through empire.

Everyone who lost someone on 9/11 grieves deeply, yet something that should give public expression to that grief so the nation can share their burden doesn't. Perhaps we can yet honor the dead by comforting the living rather than inciting them.

MIKE CLAPPER
via e-mail

COMMUNITY IS KOSHER

John Zmirak's piece on Wilhelm Röpke (June 5) reminds me of a real issue we in Chicago's Orthodox Jewish community have been groping with for close to two years now: whether to continue to patronize locally owned kosher grocery stores or to buy from the chains who now stock a full line of kosher products in various area outlets.

I must confess that, given that the Albertson's affiliate Jewel-Osco is minutes from my home, I have often sold myself out to corporate America when looking to stock up on kosher foods, but I had a pleasant reminder over the Passover holiday this past spring. My wife and I were invited over for lunch at the home of a local rabbi whose spouse proudly told us that she and her husband only supported the traditional mom and pop stores that once exclusively characterized the kosher-food trade in the Windy City. Röpke, Belloc, and Chesterton would have been proud!

DAVID L. BLATT
Chicago, Ill.

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REALITY BASED

Looking, as one blogger put it, like a recharged Energizer bunny, President Bush returned from a five-hour trip to Baghdad—where he met with the newly selected Iraqi prime minister—full of jaunty optimism and talk of “building confidence,” “restoring security,” “moving forward.”

But it's interesting to contrast the Bush photo op with the cable sent out at the same time by U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. The memo, leaked to the *Washington Post*, describes the life of Iraqi employees in the Green Zone—that is, the most secure part of Iraq—who have thrown in their lot with the American mission. Increasingly, employees have been complaining about Islamist harassment—women have been told to wear veils and not drive cars. Sad but true that Saddam's Iraq was in many ways a more liberated place than the one the American invasion has created.

Khalilzad reports that guards at the Green Zone checkpoints “seemed to be more militia-like, in some cases seemingly taunting.” Some guards held Iraqi embassy employee badges up and proclaimed “Embassy”—a death sentence if heard by the wrong people. Most embassy employees are unwilling to tell their family members where they work, the embassy has begun shredding documents that show local staff surnames, and many staffers have begun to ask “what provision would we make for them if we evacuate.” The families of embassy employees, Sunni and Shi'ite alike, are leaving Iraq, thinking “the future is too bleak.”

This situation Khalilzad describes is one of massive disaffection from the American mission—a state where strict Islamism is on the rise, where the Americans can't count on the loyalty of the Iraqis in their safe haven, where educated Iraqis are leaving.



Zalmay Khalilzad is not a “liberal journalist.” He is a neocon, a supporter of the invasion, but one who feels responsibility to tell his superiors the truth—and his reality bears little relation to the fairy tales being told from the Rose Garden.

[WAR]

BEYOND OUR CONTROL

On mondoweiss.observer.com, Phil Weiss reports from a conference at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where professors Robert Art, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt discussed international strategy before an audience of naval officers. (The latter two, of course, are authors of the much-noted essay on the Israel lobby's distortion of American foreign policy.)

The panel was asked about the “path to success” in Iraq—a war they all opposed. When his turn came, Mearsheimer told the audience how he had enlisted in the Army as a teenager then attended West Point from 1966 to 1970. He went on, “I remember once in English class we read Albert Camus's book *The Plague*. I didn't know what *The Plague* was about or why we were reading it. But afterwards the instructor explained to us that *The Plague* was being read because of the Vietnam War. What Camus was saying in *The Plague* was that the plague came and went of its

own accord. All sorts of minions ran around trying to deal with the plague, and they operated under the illusion that they could affect the plague one way or another. But the plague operated on its own schedule. That is what we were told was going on in Vietnam. Every time I look at the situation in Iraq today, I think of Vietnam, and I think of *The Plague*, and I just don't think there's very much we can do at this point. It is just out of our hands. There are forces that we don't have control over that are at play, and will determine the outcome of this one. I understand that's very hard for Americans to understand, because Americans believe that they can shape the world in their interests. But I learned during the Vietnam years when I was a kid at West Point that there are some things in the world that you just don't control, and I think that's where we're at in Iraq.”

Weiss concludes: “The panel was over. For a moment or two there was stunned silence, and then applause—at once polite, sustained and thunderous.”

[POLITICS]

DOVES AGAINST JOE

Antiwar voters have jeopardized the reelection of the Senate's most outspoken Democratic hawk. Businessman Ned Lamont has mounted a stronger-than-expected primary challenge against Sen.

Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), as the incumbent continues to support the Iraq War long after a majority in Connecticut concluded it was a disaster. Pounding away at Lieberman's closeness with the Bush administration on the war and other issues, Lamont has narrowed the gap to just 15 points among likely Democratic primary voters.

Lamont appears to have Lieberman running scared. Although he has announced he won't leave the primary race, he hasn't ruled out collecting signatures to run as an independent in case he loses. Lieberman doesn't seem to think he should have to face a primary challenger at all. He told veteran *Washington Post* columnist David Broder that an old-time Democratic mentor "genuinely believed that primaries were not only divisive but often didn't pass the ultimate test of finding the candidate who could win." But the polls show that Democrats are likely to hold onto the seat regardless of whether their nominee is Lieberman or Lamont.

Divisive or not, Lieberman may be about to learn the true purpose of competitive primaries—holding elected officials accountable for unpopular and unwise policies.

[LAW]

SPECTER'S OTHER AMNESTY

Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) has come up with a surefire way to handle the administration's apparent lawbreaking. Simply change the law—retroactively. Specter is proposing to amend the criminal punishment provisions of the Foreign Service Intelligence Act to legalize warrantless wiretapping—and to extend authorization back to 1978, when FISA was enacted, effectively pardoning anyone in the executive branch who has violated the act. Presently FISA specifies that "A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally ... engages in elec-

tronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute." Specter would amend that to read, "...except as authorized by statute, or under the constitutional authority of the president," adding for good measure that "The amendments made ... shall be construed to have the same effective date as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978."

Moreover, Specter would add a section stating, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the constitutional authority of the President ... to monitor the activities or communications of any person reasonably believed to be associated with a foreign enemy of the United States." Call it the *carte blanche* act of 2006, or call it a presidential pardon—not from the president, but rather for him and his eavesdropping cronies.

[CULTURE]

ARTISTIC LICENSE

When a society declines to calibrate esteem to "whatsoever things are lovely," choosing instead to privilege the edgy, the eccentric, and the diverse, values grow so inverted that an easel becomes as impressive as a canvas.

That was recently the case in London, where the esteemed Royal Academy displayed a piece of stone and a stick thanks to the museum's enlightened staff. Apparently the plinth and wooden support, designed to display a sculpture of a human head, were shipped separately from the actual art. The sculpture, once unpacked, was rejected, but the base was accepted for public viewing.

When the mistake was called to the Academy's attention, it answered with the ease of courtiers accustomed to complimenting the robes of a naked emperor. "The head has been safely stored ready to be collected by the artist," a statement read. "It is accepted that works may not be displayed in the way that the artist might have intended." ■

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Armistice in the Culture War?

Twice lately, this writer has been challenged by an advocate of gay rights—Robert Shrum on “Hardball” and Andrew Sullivan at the Booksellers Convention—not to

clutter up the Constitution with a new amendment but to leave the matter of homosexual marriage up to the states.

To a conservative, the argument has instant appeal, though one suspects Shrum and Sullivan are invoking states’ rights because they fear a constitutional amendment that would outlaw gay marriage. After all, when Barry Goldwater suggested that civil rights be left up to the states, liberals found the idea morally repellent.

Yet the Shrum-Sullivan idea merits consideration. And not just because the Right lacks the Senate votes for an amendment to ban gay marriage or outlaw abortion but because states’ rights is a way out, the constitutional way out, of this culture war tearing us apart.

We need to look reality in the eye. America is no longer a moral community. We no longer agree on what is right and wrong, good and evil. The cultural revolution of the 1960s, while igniting the political counterrevolution that Nixon and Reagan rode to 49-state landslides, has by now occupied the commanding heights of academia, the arts, the media, and the popular culture.

From Harvard to Hollywood, our folks need not apply. Indeed, traditionalists are seceding from institutions, communities, even cities where the counterculture is in power. Falling attendance at movie theaters, home-schooling of kids, right-wing talk-radio and TV, Christian schools, the religious divide at the ballot box, all testify that, on issues of morality, we have become two peoples and two nations.

We do not talk to each other. We shout at each other.

Consider the possibilities of a states’ rights resolution of the issues that most bitterly divide us.

Mississippi might outlaw almost all abortions; end forced busing for racial balance; forbid reverse discrimination against white folks; enact a state constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and women; allow Bible instruction, prayer, and posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools; and outlaw X-rated movies in all theaters. Mississippians could create the society they want, according to values in which a majority of Mississippians believe.

The same with the Big Apple. If they want to legalize lap dancing and ban smoking in every bar, that is their business. But Big Apple values could no longer be imposed on Utah or Wyoming.

At the close of the Thirty Years’ War that cost the lives of one-third of all Germans, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia decreed that the prince in each territory would determine the recognized religion. Their subjects, however, would be free to practice the faith they had professed a quarter century before. Religious wars were at an end.

With a return to states’ rights, the social and moral issues could be decided either by state referenda or elected representatives who could be voted out of office every two years. Society would be shaped according to the values of the people of the community, region, or state.

What stands in the way of a states’ rights solution to America’s culture war?

As ever, the Supreme Court. It was the court that, with the *Dred Scott* decision, propelled the nation to civil war and the court that, by mandating de-Christianization of public schools and declaring abortion and sodomy constitutional rights, ignited the culture war.

Had these issues been left to the states, there would have been no culture war. New York and Nebraska, Vermont and Wyoming, Utah and Massachusetts could have gone their separate ways.

How do we rediscover the lost road to the states’ rights nation, consistent with the original intent of the Constitution? The constitutional way is to clip the court’s wings by having Congress restrict the court’s jurisdiction.

Liberals would not like to live in a nation ruled by Antonin Scalia. Conservatives do not want Ruth Bader Ginsburg telling us what we must tolerate. And when it comes to gay marriages, which Americans rejected in landslides in 13 states in 2004, with 85 percent of Mississippians voting no, the final decision must not be imposed by five justices not one in ten Americans could name.

If the Shrums and Sullivans are serious, they will support the idea of Professor William Quirk, author of *Judicial Dictatorship*. Re-enact the Defense of Marriage Act, which declares that no state has to recognize gay marriage licenses issued by any other state, and append to DOMA this amendment: “No federal court, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has the right of judicial review of this law.”

That would remove the Supreme Court from the issue of gay marriage and show the way to cut the court out of every other social issue, letting the people and their elected representatives in each state decide. As Madison and Jefferson always wanted. ■

[well-oiled machine]

American Petrocracy

Among the shifting rationales for the war in Iraq, the most plausible motive may be the least discussed: access to oil.

By Kevin Phillips

FEW LIES HAVE WOUND UP injuring Americans more—in everything from automobile gas tanks and winter heating bills to diminished U.S. global standing—than a rarely revisited three-year-old fib-fest involving George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and Tony Blair. Since World War I, history is clear: the British and Americans have been pre-occupied with only one thing in Iraq—oil. Yet in 2003, as their troops again disembarked, the pretense was all about good and evil, democracy and freedom. The disastrous outcome of the unacknowledged Middle Eastern mission, the struggle for petroleum, has rarely been discussed.

In part, that's because a credulous press has swallowed an extraordinary fraud. Speaking on behalf of George W. Bush, then White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer insisted in February 2003, "If this had anything to do with oil, the position of the United States would be to lift the sanctions so the oil could flow. This is not about that. This is about saving lives by protecting the American people." In November 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had likewise declared, "it has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil." On the other side of the Atlantic, British Prime Minister Tony Blair told Parliament in early 2003, "Let me deal with the conspiracy theory that this has some-

thing to do with oil. There is no way whatever that if oil were the issue, it wouldn't be simpler to cut a deal with Saddam Hussein."

Horse manure. In the run-up to war, from Alberta to Texas, oilmen gossiped about the centrality of oil. Meetings of petroleum geologists buzzed about the so-called "peak oil" forecast that a dangerous top in global production was only a decade or two away. Specialized publications guesstimated how much taking over Iraqi oil could mean for profits and Exxon and Chevron. Polls of ordinary citizens from Europe to Latin America and the Mideast produced similar findings: people thought the invasion was about oil.

The Gulf War in 1991 certainly had been. When the first President Bush went into the Persian Gulf in force that year, it was indeed about petroleum. He openly stated, "our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein." The idea that Saddam Hussein was a second Hitler was a rhetorical embellishment. Back during the Cold War, even when Washington worried about the Soviet Union rolling into Iran and reaching the Persian Gulf, American concern arose out of the

geopolitics of oil, not some abstract commitment to representative government and democracy.

The British had indulged their own motivational buncombe in the aftermath of the First World War when the Marquess of Curzon, Britain's foreign secretary, said that the influence of oil in the new boundaries drawn for Iraq was "nil." "Oil," he said, "had not the remotest connection with my attitude, or with that of His Majesty's Government, over Mosul." By 1924, as the British agreed to cut American oil companies in for a share of Iraq's oil production, the centrality of oil was obvious. Curzon's claim that London sought to bring freedom and self-government to the Arabs was mocked in Parliament and on Fleet Street.

But that was 80 years ago, and today's opinion-molding elites—in the United States, at least—are far more gullible. Too many are still psychologically embedded in the hard-charging pretense that surrounded the 2003 U.S. military incursion. The revelation that Saddam's much trumpeted weapons of mass destruction seem not to have existed has yet to lead to the next logical re-evaluation: just how much more credibility should be given to the three sweeping "it wasn't about oil" assurances quoted earlier? After all, if oil was involved, then

the U.S. disaster in Iraq, doubly bungled, represents the greatest wartime failure since James Madison let the British burn Washington in 1814.

Vice President Dick Cheney, the one top official who avoided denying that oil had anything to do with the Iraq invasion, is precisely the man whose attentions must be examined to illustrate the depth of oil motivations. In 1999, when Cheney was still the head of Halliburton, the oil-services giant, he made a shrewd speech to the London Institute of Petroleum in which he gloomed over coming oil-supply problems: "By some estimates, there will be an average of two per cent annual growth in global oil demand over the years ahead along with conservatively a 3 percent natural decline in production from existing reserves. That means by 2010 we will need on the order of an additional 50 million barrels a day."

Those barrels would have to come largely from the Middle East, and a few years earlier the *Wall Street Journal* had reported an Anglo-American oil company consensus: that Iraq, specifically, was "the biggie" in terms of potential future reserves. During 2001, the energy task force that became Cheney's first major assignment as vice president spent much time poring over maps of the oilfields in Iraq and the rival nations—China, Russia, and France among them—to whom Saddam Hussein intended to give the concessions for development. Part of Cheney's mandate involved "actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields."

This was getting down to the primal underpinnings of the 2003 invasion. According to Paul Roberts in his 2004 book *The End of Oil*, Cheney and his task-force colleagues

pored over maps of Iraqi oilfields to estimate how much Iraqi oil might be dumped quickly on the [post-

invasion] market. Before the war, Iraq had been producing 3.5 million barrels a day, and many in the industry and the administration believed that the volume could easily be increased to 7 million by 2010. If so—and if Iraq [under U.S. control] could be convinced to ignore its OPEC quota and start producing at maximum capacity—the flood of new oil would effectively end OPEC's ability to control prices.

The Anglo-American firms, in turn, would be in the catbird's seat.

As for the supposed weapons of mass destruction, these had already played a crucial role. The United Nations sanctions imposed in the early 1990s included provisions that Saddam could not sign over development of the big Iraqi oilfields to foreign companies. On one hand, this gave the French, Russians, and Chinese an incentive to get Iraq out from under the sanctions. But

The cynic will say, yes, but why could Bush and Rumsfeld not talk a little bit about oil just as the first Bush had prior to the Gulf War? Strategically, there were major differences. In 2003, there was no Kuwait to liberate as a justification for tangling with Saddam. This time it was a flat-out invasion to topple Saddam and take control. Admitting that oil was a principal motivation would have lost the public-relations battle not just in the Middle East but around most of the world. The administration had to have some larger, more noble rationale, and the war on terror offered a broad umbrella. At every opportunity, officials of the Bush administration, not least the president himself, tried to tie Saddam Hussein to terrorism and, indirectly, even to 9/11.

Furthermore, the White House had to consider the huge religious and biblical element of the coalition that elected Bush in 2000. *Newsweek* polling back in 1999 found that 45 percent of American Christians believed in Armageddon and

THE ENERGY TASK FORCE SPENT MUCH TIME **PORING OVER MAPS OF THE OILFIELDS IN IRAQ** AND THE RIVAL NATIONS—CHINA, RUSSIA, AND FRANCE AMONG THEM—TO WHOM **SADDAM HUSSEIN** INTENDED TO GIVE THE **CONCESSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT**.

on another, the key allegations that enabled the U.S. and Britain to keep sanctions in place were—what else?—Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction. Without WMD, the sanctions would have fallen away, and the rivals of the U.S. and Britain would have gotten the "biggie" oilfields.

In short, the weapons of mass destruction drumbeat was substantially tied to oil and had already done its essential job by the time the invasion took place. Accept this logic and it makes mincemeat out of the Bush-Rumsfeld-Blair pretense.

the end times, and almost as many thought that the Antichrist was already alive and on the earth. Because such beliefs concentrate among very pro-Bush evangelicals, fundamentalists, and Pentecostals, my estimate is that some 55 percent of the people who voted for Bush in 2000 would have told pollsters about believing in the end times and Armageddon.

This will strike many as an exaggeration, but the phenomenon is an important one. Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals noted in 2003 that since the break-up of the

USSR, “evangelicals have substituted Islam for the Soviet Union. The Muslims have become the modern-day equivalent of the Evil Empire.” According to University of Wisconsin historian Paul Boyer, by the 1990s many prophecy believers saw Saddam as the Antichrist or his forerunner, partly because Saddam was rebuilding the ancient evil city of Babylon. The *Left Behind* series by Tim LaHaye fictionalized the Rapture-Tribulation-Armageddon sequence so successfully that it sold a whopping 60 million copies in book and tape form. Most of the readers were Bush backers.

Politically, this confronted the White House with both a strategic dilemma and a parallel opportunity. On the plus side, the huge chunk of Bush voters would want to view the U.S. attempt to topple Saddam Hussein in terms of the war of good versus evil. Weapons of mass destruction were a prop but collateral to the larger biblical context. Invading Iraq would evoke that context because Saddam was one of the evil ones—maybe the Evil One, given his Babylon tie-in. Toppling him could aspire to biblical interpretation. Aiding Israel was also biblically vital. Bush had already carved out a related, overarching “good versus evil” posture with his heavily religious post-9/11 rhetoric.

The minuses were fewer but cautionary. It was fine for the White House to criticize the United Nations because the international body was a favorite whipping post among the high-octane preachers given to quoting the Book of Revelation. Oil, however, wasn’t part of the biblical prophecy framework. In LaHaye’s series, petroleum was a minor strategic gambit of the Antichrist, not the business of the good guys. Oil’s increasing centrality was a bad sign on the websites of omen-counters like rapturnready.com.

Maybe this had something to do with the Bush-Rumsfeld-Blair posture of oil

not being at all involved and maybe it didn’t. However, the rhetorical fact remains: oil-related motives and objectives were insistently forsworn, even if they were prominent—especially in Dick Cheney’s petroleum-savvy mind. Many Americans think his task force has been kept wrapped in secrecy because large oil companies were closely involved, but keeping oil-related war motivations hidden may have been even more vital.

CHENEY OPINED THAT IRAQI OIL OUTPUT WOULD HIT 3 MILLION BARRELS A DAY, AND LAWRENCE LINDSEY TALKED ABOUT 3-5 MILLION, SAYING “THE KEY ISSUE IS OIL, AND A REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ WOULD FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN WORLD OIL.”

If the Americans and British did act substantially for oil—and that seems highly likely—then it is fair to judge the Iraqi failure by oil-policy yardsticks and outcomes. The quick summation, obviously, is that whereas oil was selling at roughly \$30 a barrel in 2002 as the White House was plotting its invasion and occupation, by late 2004 it cost a more painful \$40 per barrel. By the time the operation was marking its third anniversary this spring, petroleum was flirting with \$75 a barrel.

There is no room in this article to document that prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, everything about Iraq (and neighboring Kuwait) generally boiled down to oil. Suffice it to say that Iraq’s new boundaries were drawn around oil after World War I; Axis forces invaded from Syria in 1941 in pursuit of petroleum; important Persian Gulf surveys generally concentrated on oilfields; the maps Cheney looked at in 2001 were about oil; and on entering Baghdad in 2003, the first government building U.S. troops occupied was the Oil Ministry, with its seismic maps of the rich Iraqi oilfields.

Anglo-American politics had also

become increasingly shaped by oil. The Bush administration marked the first time that both the president and the vice president hailed from the oil industry. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in turn, was so close to British Petroleum that wags called BP “Blair Petroleum.”

Besides, if oil had nothing to do with the invasion, why did top officials of the Bush administration mention it in predicting how well the invasion would work out? Cheney opined that by the

end of 2003, Iraqi oil output would hit 3 million barrels a day, and Lawrence Lindsey, the White House economic adviser, talked about 3-5 million, saying in September 2002, “the key issue is oil, and a regime change in Iraq would facilitate an increase in world oil” so as to drive down prices. Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy in the Pentagon, enthused that increased Iraqi oil revenues could pay for the war. And White House speechwriter David Frum wrote in his 2003 book on Bush that the war on terror was designed to “bring new stability to the most vicious and violent quadrant of the earth—and new prosperity to us all, by securing the world’s largest pool of oil.”

The best way to assess the oil-related outcomes—all bumbles, no boons—is to use three different yardsticks: postwar oil supplies and prices; recrimination against the U.S. dollar; and the rising portion of U.S. defense outlays that had to be spent on protecting land and deep-water oilfields, pipelines, and sea lanes vital to oil tankers.

The administration’s hope that a quick and overwhelming victory in Iraq

would unleash enough new oil production to flood the markets and undercut OPEC, however absurd in retrospect, tantalized traders during the invasion weeks. On March 21, 2003, the *Financial Times* noted, “futures prices suggest that when it is over, OPEC will shower the world with crude and the price will fall out of its \$22-28 band late next year.”

Instead, occupied Iraq turned into a quagmire of guerrilla and sectarian rivalry. Insurgents attacked and disrupted pipelines and refineries, and truck drivers refused to transport oil from the north. During the winter of 2005-2006, Iraqi production dropped as low as 1.1 million barrels a day, and covering this production gap took almost all of OPEC's spare capacity and forced prices higher. Dalton Garis, an economist at the Petroleum Institute in Abu Dhabi, told the Associated Press in April 2006, “Iraq could be making a tremendous difference.” Instead, its shortfall is “a significant contributing factor to the high price of oil.”

FOR SEVERAL YEARS **PRIOR TO THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ**, THAT NATION HAD BEEN **INSISTING THAT IT WOULD PRICE ITS OIL SALES IN EUROS**, NOT DOLLARS.

American economists Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, in a draft paper entitled “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict,” reached a similar but much more detailed and buttressed conclusion. Publicly, Stiglitz and Bilmes attribute \$5-10 of the increased per barrel cost of oil to the mess in Iraq, but their private view seems to be that a very large portion of the now \$45-per-barrel oil-price increase is attributable to Iraq.

That makes sense if one considers the hostile reactions of many of the world's oil-producing nations to the behavior the Bush administration was exhibiting in

Iraq and elsewhere. For several years prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, that nation had been insisting—contrary to global policies in effect since the 1970s—that it would price its oil sales in euros, not dollars. Other major OPEC producers—Venezuela and Iran—also began talking about kindred moves and so did elements of the European community. Just after the U.S. invasion, *Newsweek's* Howard Fineman wrote that the real clash was not over weapons of mass destruction but over the dollar versus the euro—“who gets to sell—and buy—Iraqi oil, and what form of currency will be used to denominate the value of the sales ... yet another skirmish in a growing economic conflict.” Few others had the courage to raise the issue.

Had a U.S. triumph in Iraq enabled Washington to control and open the oil spigots in Iraq, OPEC would have been obliged to desist from talking about dropping the dollar to price oil in euros or a so-called basket of currencies. But as the various dimensions of U.S. failure became clear in 2003 and 2004, other

nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Russia (not an OPEC member)—began to show their currency claws. Six months after the U.S. invasion, as Iraqi oil output shrank in the face of relentless sabotage of pipelines and other facilities by insurgents, even Saudi Arabia displayed its disdain, not by currency actions but by giving a big gas-development contract to French Total instead of ExxonMobil.

As of 2006, the U.S. dollar has been dropping again, with the ever more conspicuous failure of Bush administration energy policy—this year the U.S. will spend \$300-350 billion on imported oil—

a significant backdrop. Should these trends intensify and OPEC cease to price oil in dollars, the added burden on Americans will register in everything from home heating oil in northern winters to the prohibitive cost of long-distance driving in the remote exurbs of metropolitan commuter belts. The effects of the great bungle in Iraq may only be beginning.

Still another oil cost-burden that the Iraqi failure imposes on the American people involves the huge and finally starting to be noticed portion of U.S. defense outlays that are undertaken to protect foreign oil supplies from disruption. Michael Klare, a leading U.S. scholar on resource wars and oil geopolitics, has tabulated oil-related tasks being assumed by the military from South America and West Africa to the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Straits of Malacca. His conclusion: the military “is being used more and more for the protection of overseas oil fields and the supply routes that connect them. ... Such endeavors, once largely confined to the Gulf area, are now being extended to unstable oil regions in other parts of the world. Slowly but surely, the U.S. military is being converted into a global oil-protection service.” How much do these tax-financed costs effectively add to the price of a gallon of gas or heating oil sold in the U.S.—25 cents, 40, 85?

In sum, the energy-related price of the administration's dishonesty and massive miscalculation in Iraq ought to be a central discussion point in this election year and again in 2008. The citizenry has to comprehend just how much is at stake and how the nation's future has been jeopardized. ■

Kevin Phillips's latest book, American Theocracy: The Perils and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money, was published in March by Viking Penguin.

Power of the Pen

The president uses signing statements to decree which laws apply to him.

By James Bovard

FOR GENERATIONS, Republican politicians have spoken reverently of the rule of law. But since 2001, this hoary doctrine has been redefined to mean little more than the enforcement of the secret thoughts of the commander in chief.

George W. Bush has added more than 750 “signing statements” to new laws since he took office. Earlier presidents occasionally appended such comments to new statutes, but Bush is the first to use signing statements routinely to nullify key provisions of new laws. He perennially announces that he will not be bound by limits on his power and that he will scorn obligations to disclose how federal power is being used.

While Bush supporters speak glowingly of originalist interpretations of the Constitution, Bush’s signing statements have far more in common with George III than with George Washington. The Constitution specifies that Congress shall “make all laws” and that presidents must “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” But Bush—his ego swollen by swarms of groveling intellectuals—has embraced theories that convince him that the president alone may decree what shall be the law.

Bush’s most famous signing statement was on the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. After White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales publicly declared that Bush enjoyed a “commander in chief override” regarding laws prohibiting torture, members of Congress enacted legislation to make it stark that torture was illegal. The White House engaged in long and arduous negotiations with Con-

gress. After Bush signed this law last Dec. 30, he announced that he would construe it “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.” This was widely interpreted to mean that the law is binding only when Bush pleases. He was reiterating a confidential 2002 Justice Department memo that declared that the federal Anti-Torture Act “would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President’s constitutional power to conduct a military campaign.”

Getting the Patriot Act renewed was one of the Bush administration’s highest priorities. After months of negotiations and compromises, a bipartisan agreement was finally reached, giving the White House almost everything it wanted. As part of the deal, Bush administration officials agreed to provide Congress with more details on how Patriot Act powers were being used. The Justice Department would be obliged to disclose to Congress how many Americans’ privacy was being violated by FBI subpoenas known as National Security Letters. (The *Washington Post* reported that the FBI was issuing 30,000 such letters a year). However, Bush reneged in a “signing statement” quietly released after a heavily hyped White House bill-signing ceremony. Bush decreed that he was entitled to deny Congress any information that would “impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative

process of the executive, or the performance of the executive’s constitutional duties.” Bush announced that he would interpret the law “in a manner consistent with the president’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information.”

In other words, any provision in the law that requires disclosure is presumptively null and void. The crux of the “unitary executive” is that all power rests in the president and that checks and balances are an archaic relic. This is the same “principle” the Bush administration invoked to deny Congress everything from Iraqi war plans to the records of the Cheney Energy Task Force. Bush has invoked the “unitary executive” doctrine almost 100 times since taking office, according to Miami University professor Christopher Kelley.

Democrats were furious over what they saw as a Bush Patriot Act double-cross. Representatives Jane Harman (D-Calif.) and John Conyers (D-Mich.) bitterly complained to Gonzales: “Many members who supported the final law did so based upon the guarantee of additional reporting and oversight. The administration cannot, after the fact, unilaterally repeal provisions of the law implementing such oversight.” The Bush administration ignored the complaint.

Bush’s prerogative also apparently includes the right to cover up waste, fraud, and abuse—regardless of how badly taxpayers get boarhugged. After Congress created an inspector general in late 2003 to look into the Coalition Provi-

sional Authority, Bush decreed, "The CPA IG shall refrain from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or from issuing a subpoena, which requires access to sensitive operation plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the Department of Defense related to national security, or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security." Since the Bush administration seems to consider any unfavorable press coverage a "threat to national security," it is not surprising that the inspector general found almost nothing—despite pervasive reports and rumors of massive fraud. (There is no evidence that the wording of

the best work on this subject, noted, "On at least four occasions while Bush has been president, Congress has passed laws forbidding US troops from engaging in combat in Colombia, where the US military is advising the government in its struggle against narcotics-funded Marxist rebels. After signing each bill, Bush declared in his signing statement that he did not have to obey any of the Colombia restrictions because he is commander in chief." The Colombian government's paramilitary allies have committed some of the worst atrocities in recent Latin American history. The fact that Bush would claim a unilateral right to engage in what could become a full-scale civil war in Colombia vivifies that his boundless power stems from his

hatched during the Reagan administration. Attorney General Ed Meese instructed Samuel Alito, then a Justice Department lawyer, to analyze how such presidential assertions could buttress the administration's viewpoints in court. But Alito was a piker compared to George W. Bush. Alito declared that the Justice Department should "concentrate on points of true ambiguity, rather than issuing interpretations that may seem to conflict with those of Congress."

Bush, on the other hand, has used signing statements to negate the most important parts of legislation. According to the Bush administration, if the president issues a signing statement memo that is printed in the Federal Register, federal agencies are not obliged to obey laws enacted by Congress.

The American Bar Association has appointed a bipartisan panel to examine whether Bush's signing-statement policies conflict with the Constitution. Their report is due later this summer. However, an ABA report earlier this year that concluded that Bush's warrantless wiretaps were illegal failed to make the slightest dent in either the administration's policies or its preening.

We have a nullification crisis at the heart of the American Republic. Torture is apparently legal, despite a federal prohibition. Domestic wiretapping is apparently legal, despite clear legal and constitutional prohibitions. Seizing suspects and holding them indefinitely is apparently legal, despite the Constitution's requirement of *habeas corpus*.

Apparently, the government is not obliged to obey any law that Bush does not personally approve of. And how can we know which laws Bush approves of? It's a secret. Bush's personal thoughts thus become the ultimate law of the land—and no one can know if the government is violating the "law" because Bush has not publicly declared what the law is.

APPARENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT IS **NOT OBLIGED TO OBEY ANY LAW** THAT **BUSH DOES NOT PERSONALLY APPROVE OF.**

the signing statement was dictated by Halliburton.) Bush also used a signing statement to undermine the power and independence of an inspector general for Iraq in 2004 legislation.

Another frequent target of Bush signing smittings are provisions in laws on whistleblowers. Apparently he considers legal protections for whistleblowers a violation of his own prerogatives. The administration recently swayed the Supreme Court to undermine protections for federal employees who disclose federal crimes, and the Justice Department is signaling that it could prosecute both whistleblowers and journalists who publish leakers exposing government abuses.

Some people consider Bush's "El Supremo" view of his own powers as necessary for the war on terror. But Bush claims this prerogative regarding any foreign intervention. As the *Boston Globe's* Charlie Savage, who has done

job title—not from any conflict with al-Qaeda or other "Islamofascists," as he likes to call them.

Bush's signing statements also imply that he considers the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—which prohibited using the U.S. military for domestic law enforcement—null and void. Congress passed laws in 2004 and 2005 prohibiting the military from using intelligence not "lawfully collected" on American citizens. In both cases, as Savage noted, "Bush declared in signing statements that only he, as commander in chief, could decide whether such intelligence can be used by the military." It is appalling that Congress would feel it necessary to pass a law declaring that the Pentagon cannot violate the Bill of Rights—but the president responds by declaring that he will not be bound by any such law—or by the Constitution.

The "signing statement" gambit for stretching presidential power was

Why should anyone give Bush the benefit of the doubt and assume that he is obeying all of the laws that he has not yet publicly proclaimed a right to violate? New York University law professor David Golove told the *Boston Globe*, “Where you have a president who is willing to declare vast quantities of the legislation that is passed during his term unconstitutional, it implies that he also thinks a very significant amount of the other laws that were already on the books before he became president are also unconstitutional.”

Americans may have to wait many years to learn what the rule of law meant in 2006. The truth may be suppressed until Bush’s aides begin publishing their memoirs or until the Supreme Court has a change of mood and decides that the executive branch is not entitled to boundless secrecy. In the meantime, don’t count on the legislative branch to right the balance: Bush has encountered almost no effective resistance in his own party to his power grabs. One Republican senator recently told author Elizabeth Drew: “We’ve got to hang with the president because if you start splitting with him or say the president has been abusing power we’ll all go down.” Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, recently denounced criticism of the NSA warrantless wiretapping as “insulting” to the president, Drew reported. Apparently, some prominent Republicans believe that the president cannot be criticized even after he admits breaking the law.

So what is the meaning of “limited government” in the Bush era? Merely that the courts and Congress must be prohibited from limiting the president’s power. ■

James Bovard is the author of Attention Deficit Democracy (Palgrave 2006) and eight other books.

Zarqawi’s Death Wish

How elements of the Iraqi insurgency seek to goad the U.S. into a wider war

By Justin Raimondo

AS HEADLINES trumpeted the administration’s triumph in the wake of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s death, what military spokesmen called a “treasure trove” of intelligence was discovered in the ruins of the terrorist leader’s hideout. One document in particular captured the attention of the Iraqi government and was released by Iraqi national security adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie. Journalists were quick to pick up on the story: “Captured Papers Show Weakening Insurgency” is the way ABC News and many other major media outlets spun it. But *USA Today* had it right: “Al Qaeda in Iraq Sought War Between United States, Iran.”

The document—an internal memo written by someone in the al-Qaeda leadership—complains about the many obstacles the insurgency faces: the Iraqi National Guard is more effective, massive arrests are having an impact, and interference with financial outlets available to the rebels is putting a crimp in their budget. But then again, this is the al-Qaeda style. The leaders and chief ideologues, including bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his chief adviser, always emphasize the difficulties: they are brutally realistic in their pronouncements.

However, the real gist of this fascinating look into the internal workings of Zarqawi’s terrorist sect is not that resistance to the American occupation is on the brink of collapse—it isn’t—but rather how the Zarqawi cult intends to relieve the pressure and open up a new

front in their battle to drive out the infidels. “In general and despite the current bleak situation,” the memo avers,

we think that the best suggestions in order to get out of this crisis is to entangle the American forces into another war against another country or with another of our enemy force, that is to try and inflame the situation between America and Iraq or between America and the Shi’a in general.

Specifically the Sistani Shi’a, since most of the support that the Americans are getting is from the Sistani Shi’a, then, there is a possibility to instill differences between them and to weaken the support line between them; in addition to the losses we can inflict on both parties. Consequently, to embroil America in another war against another enemy is the answer that we find to be the most appropriate.

It is the followers of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, acknowledged as the chief cleric of Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslims, who hold the majority in the Iraqi Parliament and whose party militias have effectively seized control of the nation’s security and police apparatus. It was they who forced the Americans to allow general elections to be held rather than the restricted caucuses that would have installed Ahmad Chalabi and his cronies in power.

This led to the election victory of parties that have long been subsidized and succored by Iran, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Da'wa, which dominate the governing coalition. Tensions with the Americans have long been building, as the occupation forces have alienated the population in a series of outrages stretching from Abu Ghraib to Haditha, and now the terrorists are getting ready to play the Shi'a card.

IF THERE IS ANY REAL PROSPECT OF **FANNING THE FLAMES OF A THREE-SIDED CIVIL WAR INVOLVING IRAQ, IRAN, AND THE U.S., IT LIES WITH THE SADRISTS.**

The idea is that “occupy[ing] the Americans by another front will allow the resistance freedom of movement and alleviate the pressure imposed on it.” This will kill two birds with one stone, involving “both parties, the Americans and the Shi'a, in a war that will result in both parties being losers.”

There is, the author points out, precedent for this: “The resistance fighters have learned from the result and the great benefits they reaped, when a struggle ensued between the Americans and the Army of Al-Mahdi.” This refers to the revolt of the Sadrists, followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, son of Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr, an important Shi'ite cleric killed in 1999 along with two of Muqtada's brothers. In the summer of 2004, the Sadrists took control of Najaf, along with several other Shi'ite towns, and the Americans vowed to capture the rebel cleric and crush the insurrection. Today, however, the Sadrists sit in the Iraqi Parliament, while their leader is not only free but has become the rising star of Iraqi politics, with his popularity spilling beyond the precincts of his redoubt in Sadr City, a poor Shi'ite suburb on the outskirts of Baghdad. In addition to being militantly anti-American and bitterly opposed to

the occupation, the Sadrists are also fierce nationalists and vocally hostile to Iranian influence. If there is any real prospect of fanning the flames of a three-sided civil war involving Iraq, Iran, and the U.S., it lies with the Sadrists.

It is “a war between the Americans and Iran,” however, that holds out the ultimate promise of solving the terrorists' dilemma because it would succeed in “drowning the Americans in another war that will engage many of their

forces.” Such a war would mean that the insurgents could possibly acquire new weapons from the Iranians, “either after the fall of Iran or during the battles,” and could “entice Iran towards helping the resistance.” But “how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether America is serious in its animosity. ... Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran.”

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is not alone in hoping for the outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and the mullahs of Tehran. While U.S. intelligence estimates the success of Iran's nuclear program is a decade out of reach, hysteria generated by the War Party has reached an alarming crescendo, with the president vowing that Iran will never be allowed to go nuclear. And every neoconservative columnist, from Charles Krauthammer to the lowliest blogger, has been equating Iranian President Ahmadinejad with Hitler, just as Saddam was characterized in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.

One major critic of the Zargawi papers has been Michael Ledeen, whose crusade for U.S.-sponsored regime

change in Iran has taken on the hallmarks of an obsession. He denounces the papers as forgeries and points to what he says are a number of inaccuracies as “proof” that this is so. Of course, Zargawi and his boys are fallible, and so a mistake is hardly beneath them, but if we look at these supposed errors, we see that they aren't any such thing.

To begin with, Ledeen questions the assertion of the anonymous author that there has been “a decline of the resistance's assaults.” Ledeen avers that “recently there's been a dramatic *increase* in assaults and the number of dead innocents. Precisely the opposite of what the unnamed ‘leader’ says.” Casualties may be increasing, but according to the U.S. military, the number of car-bomb attacks—the Zargawi group's specialty—is down this year by 20 percent. And it all depends on what the author means by “the resistance”—whether he means the general milieu of anti-occupation fighters, numbering some 200,000, according to the head of Iraqi intelligence, including active sympathizers, or the few hundred foreign fighters of the Zargawi group.

Ledeen's suspicions are further aroused because the documents say that there's been “an increase in the number of countries and elements supporting the occupation.” “I guess he doesn't read Italian, does he?” quips Ledeen. “And even the Brits have announced they're going to leave. Again, the opposite of the facts.” But, again, it depends: if what is meant here is “elements” *within* Iraq, then this is arguably true. The major Shi'ite groups, once openly hostile to the occupation, have toned it down, and the Shi'ite parties now in the government explicitly say the occupation must continue to ensure security—not least of all their own.

Furthermore, the tenor of the opposition to the occupation has changed among Iraq's Sunni neighbors, notably

Egypt, where President Hosni Mubarak stunned the Iraqis a few months ago when he told Al-Arabiyah television that the loyalties of Iraq's Shi'ite majority are in doubt: he clearly anticipates the consolidation of a Shi'ite super-state encompassing Saddam's former domain, a fear no doubt shared by other Sunni nations in the region. Mubarak isn't the only Sunni Arab ruler who realizes that American troops are all that stand between them and the rising Shi'a giant.

Ledeen also disdains the paper's contention that the Iranians have been of assistance to the Americans in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq. However, as a May 4 article in the *Christian Science Monitor* pointed out, Iran supports the government of Afghan President Karzai, just as it supported the overthrow of the Taliban, which murdered nine Iranian diplomats in 1998. At a March congressional hearing, the assembled experts unanimously agreed that Iran is not making waves in Afghanistan: "I do not believe Iran is a major, negative player in Afghanistan," said Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation. "If anything, the Iranian government's role in relationship with the Afghan government is actually fairly

in the Zargawi documents about how a conflict might be sparked:

1. By disseminating threatening messages against American interests and the American people and attribute them to a Shi'a Iranian side.
2. By executing operations of kidnapping hostages and implicating the Shi'a Iranian side.
3. By advertising that Iran has chemical and nuclear weapons and is threatening the west with these weapons.
4. By executing exploding operations in the west and accusing Iran by planting Iranian Shi'a fingerprints and evidence.
5. By declaring the existence of a relationship between Iran and terrorist groups (as termed by the Americans).
6. By disseminating bogus messages about confessions showing that Iran is in possession of weapons of mass destruction or that there are attempts by ... Iranian intelligence to undertake terrorist operations in America and the west and against western interests.

As for the prospect of "planting Iranian Shi'a fingerprints and evidence," last year two British special-ops soldiers in wigs and traditional Arab dress were discovered in Basra by Iraqi police, who said the pair were "acting suspiciously." When the police approached them, the Brits opened fire. The Iraqis returned fire and moved in, hauling the pair out of their car, which was discovered to contain explosives, an antitank gun, and a remote-controlled detonator. The two were arrested—but not for long. The Brits launched an emergency rescue and ordered an all-out assault on the jail, literally breaking through walls to retrieve them. Iraqi officials accused the British of planting bombs. The Brits would not comment on what sort of mission had been so rudely interrupted.

The circumstances of this incident are important, given what we have learned from the Zargawi documents. The two were stopped in the vicinity of the mayor's office, where a demonstration was going on. The protesters were Sadrists, angry that one of their local leaders had been arrested the previous day. All this took place against the backdrop of British accusations that the Iranians were behind a spate of terrorist attacks in the south. Were the fake Arabs provocateurs? Iraqi security officials certainly thought so. We'll never know the truth, but it looks suspicious—and, in light of the Zargawi-ite's stated intention to provoke a regional conflagration using the Mahdi Army as the spark, this incident takes on a rather sinister air.

Much as the U.S. welcomed news of his demise, Zargawi's ghost still haunts the blasted and bloodstained landscape of Iraq. One can almost hear his mad spirit let out a crazed laugh as his enemies maneuver to bring his project to fruition. ■

Justin Raimondo is editorial director of Antiwar.com.

PRESENTED WITH "EVIDENCE" OF IRANIAN WMD, WE'LL HAVE NOT ONLY THE RIGHT BUT THE OBLIGATION TO QUESTION THE SOURCE.

decent." New York University professor Barnett Rubin warned, "[W]e should be wary of anyone who is trying to sell intelligence or reports that Iran is trying to destabilize Afghanistan. It is not."

One can't help but agree that we ought to be wary of Ledeen, especially when it comes to Iran, but our wariness should extend to all reports of alleged Iranian perfidy aimed at the West, especially when we note the following suggestions

When we hear rumors about an alleged terrorist threat from Iran—pro-Iranian Hezbollah cadres poised and ready to carry out suicide bombings at Wal-Marts—we'll have every reason to wonder if, perhaps, this is al-Qaeda talking. Presented with "evidence" of Iranian WMD, we'll have not only the right but the obligation to question the source—is it an "Iranian opposition group," or Osama bin Laden & Co.?

Man of the House

John Hostettler takes his stand in Indiana's "Bloody Eighth."

By W. James Antle III

WHETHER REPUBLICANS maintain their grip on the House of Representatives this fall depends in no small part on congressmen like John Hostettler. The six-term Indiana Republican represents one of the competitive districts Democrats need to win if they are going to reclaim the speaker's gavel. He is also among the House conservatives counseling against compromise with the Senate on amnesty for illegal immigrants. The GOP majority will be imperiled if Hostettler loses either his seat or his party's immigration debate.

There are other, better known legislators who have weighed in against the Senate's Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act. Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) will head the House negotiating team once a conference committee is appointed. Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.) has been keeping up the pressure on the airwaves and on Capitol Hill.

But as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration, border security, and claims, Hostettler, 45, has been a forceful proponent of the enforcement-only approach that passed the House in December. And if the "long look" House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) plans for the Senate immigration bill takes the form of hearings—a highly unusual move House Republican leaders floated publicly and then appeared to back away from amidst Senate grumbling—Hostettler will help pick the amnesty proposal apart.

"John is a point man on the most discussed domestic issue of our time," says

Congressman Lamar Smith (R-Texas), Hostettler's predecessor as chairman of the immigration subcommittee and a veteran of the 1990s immigration debate. "He is exactly the right man for the job. He's steady, decent, and knowledgeable, and that's a potent combination."

Hostettler has also compiled one of the strongest immigration-control voting records in Congress. He belongs to Tancredo's Immigration Reform Caucus and receives the highest possible grades from Americans for Better Immigration. "It is in the best interest of the Republican majority for the House to stand its ground," he says. "The Senate bill is just a re-enactment of 1986."

"The idea that we can only enforce immigration law through mass deportations is a red herring," Hostettler argues, citing past bipartisan immigration-reform commissions for support. "Barbara Jordan didn't believe that. Father Hesburgh didn't believe that." He maintains that backers of the Senate bill and various guest-worker compromises—including one proposed by fellow Indiana Republican Mike Pence—are missing the main element drawing illegal immigrants to the United States.

"I oppose a path to citizenship," Hostettler says, "but for most illegals the prize isn't citizenship. The prize is the job. Enforce employer sanctions, turn off the jobs magnet, and you will take away their motivation for being in the United States. They will go home on their own."

In person, Hostettler is quiet but intense and, perhaps surprisingly, empa-

thetic toward the illegal aliens he wants to encourage to leave the country. "Their means of fulfilling their financial goals are here," he says while explaining why he believes self-deportation is feasible, "but their hearts are back home, as is the case with most human beings."

"Americans aren't a xenophobic people," Hostettler says. "When we look in the mirror, we see many different kinds of faces looking back. But we believe in assimilation. And we know it doesn't make sense to have 6 billion people competing for our jobs."

Hostettler also raises concerns about the national-security implications of unchecked illegal immigration in an age of terrorism, but his focus isn't confined to America's southern border. He angered Canadian politicians and commentators when he suggested that Prime Minister Stephen Harper "laughed off" recent alleged Islamic terrorist plots and complained that Canada's lax immigration and refugee policies put the United States at risk.

Even some conservatives cried foul. Adam Daifallah, a former Washington correspondent for the *New York Sun*, argued in National Review Online that Hostettler's comments were "beyond the pale." Others argued that Hostettler's reference to "south Toronto" as a favorable location for Islamic radicals indicated a lack of familiarity with the area. Hostettler counters that Canadian security analyst David Harris made similar points about Ottawa's immigration and counterterrorism policies in his testimony before the immigration subcommittee.

While immigration has definitely raised Hostettler's profile, he isn't a single-issue congressman. He decided to run in 1994 based on the same passions that were animating conservative Christians throughout the country that year—concern about gays in the military, opposition to national health insurance and federally funded fetal-tissue research, and a general dissatisfaction with the administration of Bill Clinton. "My children weren't going to grow up in the same kind of country I did," he says. "I decided I needed to take a stand."

Hostettler had never been involved in politics before his first congressional bid. A devout Baptist family man with four children, he worked as a power plant performance engineer at Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company. "John's an engineer, not a lawyer," says Congressman Smith. "That gives him a practical outlook on emotional issues like immigration."

Backed by a large family—the congressman is the eighth of ten children—and a small army of evangelical volunteers, Hostettler unexpectedly topped a six-way Republican primary. He went on to unseat six-term Democratic Congressman Frank McCloskey while the GOP won majorities in both houses.

Hostettler was like many of members of the 1994 freshman class. He supported tax cuts, balanced budgets, and welfare reform while opposing abortion, gay rights, and most Clinton administration policies. He peppers his speeches with quotes from the Founding Fathers. But unlike many of his colleagues, he didn't become a rubberstamp for the White House once George W. Bush became president in 2001.

"Some people in the conservative movement believe the same things that liberals do," he says. "The federal government should be the payer of first resort and the Constitution means whatever the Supreme Court says."

When Republican congressional leaders ratcheted up discretionary spending, Hostettler voted against many appropriations and GOP-backed budgets. He voted against the entire Katrina relief package on the grounds that it was susceptible to waste and abuse and claimed vindication when up to \$1.4 billion in fraud was eventually uncovered. He opposed the Bush administration's education-reform initiative, No Child Left Behind, and its expansion of Medicare to include prescription-drug coverage.

"The president was calling people as late as 1 or 2 in the morning to get them to vote for the Medicare prescription-drug benefit," says Congressman Walter Jones (R-N.C.). "John voted his conscience first, not his party."

Hostettler's independence frustrates his opponents and thrills his supporters. "I admire him so much," says Jones. "He knows more about the Constitution than almost anyone in Congress."

"I WAS NEVER ASSURED THERE WAS ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE WMD CLAIMS," HE RECALLS.

According to Thomas Washburne, a former Hostettler staffer who now works for a free-market think tank, his old boss stands out in Washington. "A number of folks just want to work their way up in the party, eat a lot of chicken, and become a congressman," he says. "They get in the mode of doing whatever the party says. John is a very different kind of guy."

The congressman's most daring break with his party may have been over the Iraq War. The House Armed Services Committee member attacked Bush's policy of pre-emption on the floor. "Don't fire unless fired upon." It is a notion that is at least as old as St. Augustine's 'Just War' thesis and it finds agreement with the Minutemen and Framers of the Constitution," Hostettler said. "We

should not turn our back today on millennia of wisdom by proposing to send America's beautiful sons and daughters into harm's way for what might be."

He ended up being one of just six House Republicans to vote against authorizing the use of force. "I was never assured there was enough evidence to support the WMD claims," he recalls. But among Republicans in his district, it was not a popular vote. A longtime Hostettler supporter called the office and angrily said he "no longer wanted anything to do" with the congressman, reducing the volunteer who answered the telephone to tears. "She wasn't being paid to take what she took," Hostettler says.

After no weapons of mass destruction were found, however, Hostettler observes "it was like night and day. Nobody initiates a conversation with me about my vote on Iraq anymore." He has been similarly prudent on Iran, signing a letter

with 11 other House Republicans urging the Bush administration to engage in direct negotiations with Tehran. The statement reminds the president that his "no negotiation" stance has not yielded positive results."

Yet Hostettler remains the only anti-war House Republican who hasn't signed onto the Homeward Bound Resolution, co-sponsored by his friend Walter Jones, requiring a withdrawal from Iraq. Hostettler also voted for the GOP's pre-election resolution rejecting a timetable for bringing the troops home, which was criticized even by some pro-war Republicans.

"While Congressman Hostettler opposes the war in Iraq, he believes that we have to support the war fighters who

are putting their lives on the line every day,” explains his spokesman. Hostettler says he wants to see troops leave Iraq “in substantial numbers” this year but believes military advisers must determine how to do it safely.

Hostettler decries “partisan political posturing” by people who “were for the war when close to 70 percent were for it and are against it now that close to 70 percent are against it.” “I voted against the war when it counted,” he says. “I’m not absolving the president of his responsibility, but Congress could have said ‘no’.”

Although Hostettler is one of the few Republicans to consistently oppose President Bush’s biggest mistakes, the administration’s unpopularity has endangered him. Indiana’s “Bloody Eighth” congressional district is known for its close elections, and Hostettler has never won more than 53.4 percent of the vote, underperforming Bush in his district by almost eight points. He does little fundraising—his last opponent out-raised him \$1.5 million to \$480,210—and retains few campaign staffers. This year, his Democratic opponent is folksy, pro-war Sheriff Brad Ellsworth. Political analyst Stuart Rothenberg writes of the Democrats’ chances to defeat Hostettler, “It’s now or never. And it certainly looks like it is now.”

“I don’t have the liabilities on Iraq, amnesty, or spending,” Hostettler acknowledges. “But I know that the only way for voters in my district to get to them is through me.”

While the political damage of the Iraq invasion and big-government conservatism has been done, House Republicans still have the chance to follow Hostettler’s lead rather than the president’s on immigration. The GOP can either save its John Hostettlers or allow the White House to make more Republican districts look like the Bloody Eighth on election day. ■

One World Cup

Soccer gives American elites the chance to celebrate nationalism in other countries but not ours.

By Steve Sailer

JUST AS BRAZIL, soccer’s dominant nation, has been the “Country of the Future” for, roughly, ever, the quadrennial arrival of another month-long World Cup reminds us that, for Americans, soccer is the Sport of the Future and always will be. Every four years Americans get lectured that the World Cup is the biggest single-sport competition on Earth and that we’ll no doubt be hoping on this global bandwagon Real Soon Now.

Yet during the first weekend of the 2006 event, more people in America watched the World Cup on foreign-language networks such as Univision than on English-language ABC. Univision has paid \$325 million for the Spanish-language rights in America to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups, while Disney (ABC and ESPN) chipped in only \$100 million for the English-language rights to these same 128 games. NBC, in contrast, bought the 2010 Winter Olympics and 2012 Summer Olympics for \$2.2 billion.

Lately, though, a soccer-crazed fraction of our post-nationalist verbal elite has switched tactics and now implies that Americans will never get excited about soccer as a spectator sport because we just don’t deserve “the beautiful game.” In the new anthology *The Thinking Fan’s Guide to the World Cup*, novelist Dave Eggers contends that watching soccer on TV hasn’t caught on here because “people of influence in America long believed that soccer was the chosen sport of Communists. ... If

you were soccer, the sport of kings, would you want the adulation of a people who elected Bush and Cheney, not once but twice?”

This World Cup in Germany offers the soccerati the opportunity to flaunt their cosmopolitanism as they elucidate the exhilarating subtleties you likely missed in that Croatia-Japan nil-nil draw because you prefer native pastimes such as baseball, basketball, or, God forbid, NASCAR. The “celebrate diversity” folk want America to become athletically homogeneous with the rest of the world. To them, the tepid American response to the World Cup is evidence of our bigotry, our xenophobic failure to get with the global program. As Kevin Michael Grace says, their slogan would be “One people, one world, one sport,” if they weren’t so freaked out by all the host-country fans waving German flags. Ironically, while the World Cup is an occasion for globalist preening in the U.S., in the rest of the world it’s a prime locus for jingoism.

A common defense among intellectual soccer advocates against charges of status-climbing is that they are instead welcoming the Hispanicization of America by mass immigration. But in truth, soccer is growing in the U.S. on two distinctly separate tracks, the immigrant and the upper middle class.

When my family lived in Chicago’s Uptown neighborhood, an immigrant entryway where 100 different languages are supposedly spoken in two square miles, every Saturday morning the

adjoining soccer fields would swarm with white yuppie families from the posh Lincoln Park neighborhood attending American Youth Soccer Organization games. Intrigued, my wife repeatedly called AYSO to sign our boys up, but she got the runaround until she finally swore that, despite living in an immigrant neighborhood, our boys were not demonically gifted foreign soccer dervishes but just American-born klutzes like the rest of the league.

As with many aspects of American life, however, where the tangible contributions of Latin American immigration have been slower to arrive than forecasted by the advocates of multiculturalism, the enormous Hispanic influx into America has had less impact on American soccer than the census numbers would suggest. Only two of the 23 players

tykes is almost guaranteed to stumble into a few goals. (That's why college robot-building competitions typically feature soccer matches.) When my five-year-old would trot off the field after one of his AYSO games, which he spent discussing the Power Rangers with his opponents while occasionally swiping at the ball as it rolled past, he'd brightly inquire, "Did we win? How many goals did I score?"

To us Americans, a kids' soccer game doesn't look all that different from the endlessly ineffectual endeavors of the scoreless 1994 Brazil-Italy World Cup final in the Rose Bowl. Similarly, because we can't recognize quality soccer, we're as happy to root for our women as our men. We were ecstatic over America's victory in the 1999 Women's World Cup of soccer. We'd

games—perhaps not surprisingly when considering the quality of the competition—and thus its position as the top sport.

Unfortunately, there's a cost to abjuring the use of the opposable thumb: competence. While the average National Basketball Association team sinks three dozen field goals per 48-minute game, the all-star squads in the knockout rounds of the 2002 World Cup averaged less than one goal per 90-minute game. The reason soccer so often seems like an exercise in futility is that it's played with the wrong part of the anatomy.

For a conspicuous component of our alienated punditry, though, soccer's ennui is perversely attractive. *The New Republic*, under the editorship of Franklin Foer, author of the 2004 book *How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization*, has gone gaga over the World Cup.

Geopolitical theories of soccer (and soccer theories of geopolitics) trace back at least to Henry Kissinger's bravura 1986 essay on how differences in national character are embodied in the contrasting styles of their teams. Dr. K. majestically analogized:

The German national team plays the way its general staff prepared for the war. ... At the same time, [it] suffers from the same disability as the famous Schlieffen plan for German strategy in World War I. There is a limit to human foresight; psychological stress on those charged with executing excessively complex maneuvers cannot be calculated in advance. If the German team falls behind, or if its intricate approach yields no results, its game is shadowed by the underlying national premonition that in the end even the most dedicated effort will go unrewarded, by the nightmare that ultimately fate is cruel.

IT'S FUN, GOOD EXERCISE, CHEAP, AND, **UNLIKE BASKETBALL OR FOOTBALL, IT DOESN'T HELP TO BE 7-FEET TALL OR 300 POUNDS.**

on the U.S. World Cup roster have Spanish surnames. In contrast, six players are black, even though African-Americans overall show little interest in the game.

Soccer is by no means a bad sport to play. It's fun, good exercise, cheap, and, unlike basketball or football, it doesn't help to be 7-feet tall or 300 pounds. In fact, soccer shares many virtues with hiking, but there are no hiking hooligans and nobody calls you a chauvinistic boor if you don't watch Sweden v. Paraguay on TV in the World Hiking Cup.

The American professional classes have learned that soccer is a terrific game for small children. In comparison, tee-ball generates farce, while Little League baseball inflicts humiliation on rightfielders who drop fly balls, strike out, and get picked off. (Not that I'm bitter or anything.) Via random Brownian motion, a soccer team of

beaten the world! When cynics pointed out that the world, other than China and Norway, doesn't much care about women's soccer, well, that just made us even prouder of how liberated our women are, compared to those poor, oppressed women of Paris, Milan, and London, whose consciousnesses haven't been raised enough to want to trade in their Manolo Blahniks for soccer spikes.

Why is soccer played so much around the world? The countless hand-eye coordination sports like tennis, golf, ping-pong, and boxing are more popular taken together than foot-eye coordination sports like soccer, hacky sack, and tlachtli (that Aztec ballgame where every contest was sudden death—the losing team captain was sacrificed to the gods). Yet no single sport commands a large market share of hand games, while soccer holds a gigantic slice among foot

Sadly, it has been downhill for soccer highbrowisms ever since, with *The New Republic* posting endless World Cup Deep Thoughts, including a classic on the psychosexual relationship between “the Suez Canal conflict of 1963” and the rise of English soccer hooliganism. (Uh, actually, Suez was in 1956.)

Obsessing over soccer has “been a way of resisting assimilation, because it’s always been such a foreign phenomenon in the country,” explains Foer, who was raised in our nation’s capital by his baseball-crazed father. So Foer isn’t “resisting assimilation,” but de-assimilating away from his native culture. Not surprisingly, Foer has denounced American criticism of soccer as “Buchananite.”

The irony is that if soccer were a traditional American game, these same commentators would be excoriating it as politically retrograde. Around the world, soccer fans are far more explicitly nationalist, uneducated, working class, and reactionary (not that there’s anything wrong with that!) than those of any American sport other than professional

expensively educated captains of industry, the fans of cricket, rugby, and golf, must proclaim that since boyhood they have stood on the terraces with the lads. Because the game is only minimally entertaining to watch, it leaves many idle minds to become the devil’s workshop. While hooliganism has ebbed since 1989, when 94 fans died in a stampede at Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield, England, and no country has invaded a soccer rival since the 1967 Futbol War between El Salvador and Honduras that cost about 2,000 lives, the level of off-field violence remains wholly alien to American sports.

To the common people of Europe, whose ancient nation-states are being dissolved by immigration, economic globalization, and the Eurocrats of Brussels, soccer provides a rare outlet for expressing their love of country. Unfortunately, in the minds of the ruling caste of Europe, the linkage between national pride and soccer hooliganism only reinforces their belief that all people of quality disdain patriotism.

Soccer, rugby, and American football evolved out of medieval English mass mêlées in which the livelier lads of rival villages would celebrate Shrove Tuesday by trying to propel an inflated pig’s bladder past the other mob. In England, soccer became the gentleman’s game played by thugs and rugby the thug’s game played by gentlemen.

Today, the English Premier League, which formed in 1992 with the backing of Rupert Murdoch’s satellite TV channel, is the biggest money circuit in all of soccer, with the most fans around the world. In contrast, the professional leagues in Brazil, home to the best playing talent, are moribund due to corruption, with almost all their best players in Europe.

Strikingly, one place where soccer is not terribly popular is in Britain’s cultural offspring. Being equally blessed with co-operative creativity, Canadians instead devised ice hockey and Australians developed Aussie rules football.

Similarly, Americans didn’t need to import soccer or rugby because we could cultivate our own variant. American football was adopted by the Republic’s commercial classes and refined into the most perfect sport for television the world has known. While soccer remains hamstrung by the need to keep the game affordable in the Third World, Americans could adopt costly innovations such as separate offensive and defensive units that make the football far more exciting than soccer, where tired players often visibly dog it around the field.

In summary, Americans play soccer—at least until we are co-ordinated enough to try other sports—but we don’t watch it on TV. Quite possibly, we’ve found the world’s best way to deal with soccer. ■

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IN ENGLAND, SOCCER BECAME THE GENTLEMAN’S GAME PLAYED BY THUGS AND RUGBY THE THUG’S GAME PLAYED BY GENTLEMEN.

wrestling. To the American alienists, however, lauding foreign nativists illustrates their cultural and moral superiority over their fellow Americans.

Outside the U.S., soccer players don’t start out too bright on average and a lifetime of bouncing balls off their skulls doesn’t improve matters. Not surprisingly, soccer statistics only recently surpassed the rudimentary. If Bill James, the great baseball numbers analyst, had been born in a soccer country, he would have expired of mental inanition.

In Tony Blair’s vulgarized Cool Britannia, it looks like the class war is over and the chavs have won. Even the most

While soccer is usually extolled or derided as a Eurosport—Tom Piatak calls it “the metric system in short pants”—it is actually another triumph of Anglo-Saxon culture. Sports have been played all over the world for all of history, but 19th-century Britain and its offshoots possessed a genius for self-organization. The Victorian emphasis on fair play created enough trust for local sportsmen to be able to co-operate nationally. Most of today’s major spectator sports, such as baseball, basketball, track and field, ice hockey, boxing, cricket, tennis, and golf, were formalized by English-speakers in the 1800s.

Wasteland of Wealth

Is the purpose of life—and work—only money?

By Chilton Williamson Jr.

ARISTOTLE, in the *Politica*, held that the nature of a thing is its end. From this, he concluded that “the quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general’s or the physician’s art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health.” While the political leader, the general, and the physician must earn a living, beyond that necessity wealth is an incidental, not a primary, aim of their profession. “Nevertheless,” Aristotle acknowledges, “some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute.” Unlike the citizens of 4th-century Athens, it scarcely occurs to those of the 21st-century West that anyone would think otherwise. That is the principal distinction between the civilization of the ancients and the barbarism in which modern men and women dwell in self-imposed captivity.

For the West, there is ultimately no purpose, no reason, no standard, no justification for, nor comprehension of, anything but the wealth it produces or attracts to itself. Here is the cause of the drab uniformity of secular capitalist democracy, its deadness of soul, its spiritual and social malaise, its intellectual morabundity, its perversity, its destructiveness, its craziness, its fundamental insanity. The industrial wasteland that Eliot described—a wasteland of smuts, dead weeds, rickety typewriters, squalid flats, and foldaway beds—like the spiritual one he also deplored, is the byprod-

uct merely of another, greater wasteland that has since spread itself about the entire world. This is the wasteland of wealth, where nothing can grow but money, and money, like a noxious weed, crowds out and kills all else, since nothing save money can live, let alone flourish, on lucre alone.

A more mundane way of saying the same thing is to remark that today, “It’s all about the bottom line.” Yet if this amounts to a trite observation, it is also a mostly unexplored and unplumbed one. What, really, are the consequences to a society whose sole criterion by which to assess governmental efficacy, general prosperity, social well-being and content, good health, educational attainment, intellectual, artistic, and scientific accomplishment, enjoyment and appreciation of the natural world, and what used to be called gracious living is the amount of money produced or consumed by these things? A knowledge of history, of course, would give us a very close idea of what those consequences are. However, since the history taught today is largely a smattering of ideological factoids gleaned from rude accounts of uncivilized or semi-civilized peoples, real history is mostly unavailable to all but that tiny remnant, the truly educated. So perhaps an inductive approach to the question is of greater use than the historical one. What are the observed as well as the expectable results for a great nation in substituting a particular end for a near infinity of others to which it is only indirectly connected?

The first thing to be said is that if the nature of a thing is indeed its end, then

the end of a thing is its nature—so that, if everything has the same end, then all things are the same. Politics, finance, poetry, music, architecture, philosophy, medicine, agriculture, sports, amusements, cooking—all these supposedly various activities are in fact identical: that is to say, they are commercial.

I recall reading the casual statement “America is a commercial society” and being struck by that simple sentence. I cannot say why I found it striking, as nothing on earth could be more obvious. Perhaps, that is why the fact is so seldom put that way. Rather, we say, “America is a democratic society,” or “America is a capitalist society”—better yet, “America is a democratic-capitalist society.” “Commercial” by comparison sounds so humdrum, so bourgeois, so small-minded, unheroic, and petty, calling to mind Napoleon’s contemptuous dismissal of the “nation of shopkeepers” (in our own case, mallkeepers). Nevertheless, it conveys the reality of America best.

It is clear what elemental and total violence is done to a thing when it is perverted from its inherent end to some subsidiary, and even contradictory, one. (In this way, the novel as Austen wrote it becomes *The Da Vinci Code*, a 19th-century farm dinner is recreated as Meal Number 5 on a Denny’s menu.) But remember, we have declared all ends to be the same today, and therefore all things! And so, who should complain? The answer is: all who appreciate diversity in human existence and long for more of it, not less. When everyone—the politician, the lawyer, the businessman,

the poet, the farmer, the singer, the builder—is engaged in precisely the same enterprise—commerce—the result is not only the lowest-common-denominator banality of the work produced but a suffocating social and cultural uniformity. The multiculturalists are quite right in suggesting that diversity is the spice of life. In fact, it is the bread of life. But it is not the diversity of the Tower of Babel that we are after, but the diversity of Alexandria, 4th- and 3rd-century Athens, Rome in its Golden Age, 18th-century London, and antebellum Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans.

The situation is aggravated by the profound dishonesty of the commercialists and the diversifiers, both of whom have much to gain—and to keep—by relegating the fact of a reigning uniform commercial culture to the status of Dirty Little Secret. Nobody, it seems, cares all that much for money as such, even while making an indecent amount of it. Instead, to judge from full-page newspaper ads, television commercials, press releases, and the like, everyone does everything nowadays in a spirit of love and compassion.

Politicians protest that the sole reward of their endeavors would be to have succeeded in establishing heaven on earth. Businessmen talk as if the aim of capitalistic enterprise were not profits but catering to the public's every material whim and to its instinct for endless self-gratification through well-deserved self-reward. Scientists suggest modestly that they strive only to make men as omnipotent as Zeus and longer-lived than Methuselah. Artists of all sorts, together with the corporations that publish, record, and promote them, claim to be liberating humanity from the constraints of history and society—and from itself. So the pretense has been institutionalized, almost beyond challenge. It is the rare publishing house editor who will admit, in rejecting a "literary novel"

(what other kind of novel is there?), that his decision is based upon commercial, not literary, criteria. Instead, in his rejection note he poses as literary critic: "I'm sorry to say I find the protagonist unsympathetic." ("Unsympathetic"—like Oedipus, Macbeth, or Charles Ryder?)

As for the diversifiers, what they choose to leave unsaid is that, in their encouragement of diversity, they are actually trying to achieve that same sameness which, for a commercial society, is absolutely the highest of all goods—saving the almighty dollar, of course. The fundamental similarities between the multicultural agenda and the corporate-commercial one explain why the multiculturalists and the corporatists get on so well together; why, indeed, they have come to be firm allies over the last 20 years. The hoary maxim "Divide and conquer" has in the course of millennia proved its utility, certainly. But it is not the only effective strategy, as ideologues and marketers well know. Rather, there are instances in which "Agglomerate and dominate" works as well, or better. An agglomerated people is easier to rule than a differentiated people, as an agglomerated market is easier to control, and exploit, than a precartelized or fascist one. The more the world is the same, in thought, activity, and taste, the easier the work of the political and commercial elites becomes.

Tocqueville remarked of America that, "in the long run, the sight of this excited [that is, active] community becomes monotonous, and the spectator who has watched this pageant for some time gets bored." He added, "American society appears animated because men and things are constantly changing; it is monotonous because all these changes are alike." In democracies, unlike aristocracies, the great Frenchman explained, not only are all men alike, but they are all engaged in like activities. And because the chief passion of men living in demo-

cratic times is for wealth, or wealth's rewards, those activities are restricted largely to moneymaking.

Aristotle distinguished between what he called the art of wealth-getting that is unnecessary—that is, the accumulation of unlimited wealth for its own sake—and the necessary art of wealth-getting that is a natural part of the art of household management. Clearly, the wealth-getting Tocqueville described belongs to the first category. He tried in his book to be understanding of this behavior: the Americans were passionate for wealth, he suggested, "not because their souls are narrower but because money really is more important [in democratic times]." In order to judge fairly, he argued,

We must first understand what the purport of society and the aim of government is to be. If it be your intention to confer a certain elevation upon the human mind, and to teach it to regard the things of this world with generous feelings, to inspire men with a scorn of mere temporal advantage, to give birth to living convictions, and to keep alive the spirit of honorable devotedness; if you hold it a good thing to refine the habits, to embellish the manners, to cultivate the arts of a nation, and to promote the love of poetry, of beauty, and of renown ... you must avoid the government of democracy, which would be a very uncertain guide to the aim you have in view.

While Tocqueville proceeded from here to offer a democratic "purport" as an alternative to the aristocratical ideal, one senses nevertheless that in this instance his European prejudices were agitated on behalf of aristocracy, which in his mind would have comported with Aristotle's criterion for the best political community as that which "is best for all those who are most able to realize their ideal of

life”—meaning, people superior by nature to the common run of mankind.

Yet on closer inspection, we find that Aristotle, in spite of his contempt for unnecessary wealth-getting, reserved his greatest scorn for those who, having failed at the game of wealth-getting as an end, turned their hand to “other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature.” Thus, the ancient Athenian philosopher could well have been more understanding of American democratic-commercial society than was the gentle French aristocrat who sympathized with democracy, if only because he had become convinced that it was God’s plan for mankind.

Readers of *Democracy in America* are likely to take from the book the impression that Tocqueville considered democracy and civilization to be finally incompatible. “Democracy not only gives the industrial classes a taste for letters but also brings an industrial spirit into literature. ... Democratic literature is always crawling with writers who look upon letters simply as a trade ...” That was certainly true of early 19th-century America, as it is of the United States nearly 200 years later. The difference is that, in Tocqueville’s day, the industrialization of everything was resisted—and pretty heartily, too—by a determined minority of civilized Americans who, while insisting on using every one of their faculties in accordance with its nature, managed to make their voices heard and finally to prevail in their own time. Their achievement was possible because America in 1831 was a still a civilization, as well as a democratic society. Thus we see that democracy can be no sufficient excuse for tolerating the commercial barbarism that is strangling American and Western civilization today. ■

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Reconciling Christendom

Catholic and Orthodox Churches contemplate unity.

By Marcia Christoff Kurapovna

ONE OF THE MORE beautiful fault lines of Western civilization runs not too far from where I live in Vienna. Two Easters ago, the lattice of cobblestone paths took me from the dark majesty of St. Stephen’s Cathedral into the frescoed melancholy of the city’s sumptuous Greek Orthodox church. Both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox celebrations had fallen on the same day, and I, a member of the latter camp and an admirer of the former, traveled an emotional trajectory linking the austere Holy Saturday services of Austrian Catholicism with the dramatic midnight ritual of the Byzantine legacy.

The sundown vigil of that great Viennese cathedral represents the classic idea of *pietas austriaca* in its fullest expression: aristocratic pride carried with personal modesty; baroque hierarchy tempered with introspectiveness; imperial grandeur crossed with Eucharistic intimacy. A couple of hours later, I continued on to the Fleischmarkt, where just before midnight 100 or so Orthodox had emerged from the Greek church. An ordered procession of faithful holding long candles moved slowly along the street like a group of ancient mariners lighting their way home. The stillness was broken by the thunder of *Christos Anesti* (“Christ has risen”) from the church’s metropolitan. An eager chorus of *Isos Anesti* (“Indeed, He has risen”) rose from the assembled crowd.

For years I have gone between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy—one part expatriate curiosity, the other tribal loyalty—but witnessing in one evening the

Easter celebrations of two historically antagonistic churches, I could not help but wonder about the force of Christianity as a schism-less whole. That is a feeling under much formal discussion these days, one that could see within the decade these two sides of the Christian West unified in far more ways than a blessed chance of dates.

In the past half-decade or so, a quiet revolution has been taking place between the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches as the two sides have begun a historic dialogue on full reconciliation. The movement—based in Vienna where it is led most actively by the independent Catholic organization Pro Oriente along with the support of some of the most powerful clerical representatives of the two sides—has brought about a contact between both churches that in the early 1990s would have been unheard of.

This active reconciliation got substantially underway in 1999, when Pope John Paul II became the first pope since the Great Schism of 1054 to visit an Eastern Orthodox country—in this case, Romania—where he was received by Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox crowds chanting, “Unity!” In November 2004, John Paul II returned the bones of Patriarchs John Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen to Istanbul, the first saint known to have been and the second possibly taken as war booty from Constantinople by Crusaders during the notorious Rome versus Constantinople Fourth Crusade of 1204. Later in 2004, Rome and the Patriarchate of Constantinople—the name still used for the primary of 15 auto-

cephalous Eastern Orthodox Churches—held their first talks at the Vatican.

The occasion of this meeting was the first official step toward “full communion”—that is, the most critical standard in Christian doctrine of recognition between two churches, requiring total mutual agreement on the most essential aspects of church doctrine. About six months later, upon the death of John Paul II, Patriarch Bartholomew I became the first ecumenical patriarch to attend the funeral of a pope in centuries. When Pope Benedict XVI, after his ascension to the papacy in May 2005, stated that the “ecumenical movement”—the idea of a universal Christian church—was his fundamental priority, this announcement was immediately considered the most profound expression to date of the seriousness of the reconciliation dialogue.

For their part, the Eastern churches have become slowly open to the idea, following years of post-communist insecurity that such reconciliatory overtures disguised the Vatican's strength with regard to the Eastern Church. While the Greek Orthodox Church may be said to be more open to Rome, the Moscow Patriarchate, having once blocked a visit by Pope John Paul II in Russia, officially started to receive Vatican officials in 2005. The Russian church removed a further obstacle to unity by canonizing the family of Tsar Nicholas II in August 2000, a move intended to put to rest concerns about its past ties with the Soviet regime.

Since then, the contacts have become regular: a major conference between high-ranking representatives of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches on the future of Europe took place in early May, the first of its kind. There is far from total consensus on certain issues between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches—the territorial jurisdictions of Eastern Catholics who practice Eastern rites but

answer to Catholic Rome being one of them—but the advance in relations between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox has been nothing short of phenomenal.

Why all this is happening now is mainly attributed to the common outrage of the two churches toward the steady march of nihilism through the West and its powerful political advocates in European capitals. Another aspect concerns their mutual wariness over the rise of Islam in Europe, the result of immigration overload, the spillover of Middle Eastern extremism as witnessed in the Madrid and London bombings, not to mention the rise of Muslim violence in Holland, England, and Denmark.

Islam itself has reinforced the secularist tide, rather than inspiring a more defensive Christian reaction, as continental politicians clamor to assert abortion, homosexual marriage, liberal drug laws, legalized prostitution, cloning, and so on as expressions of Western culture's full flowering. “The new soft totalitarianism that is now advancing on the left wants to have a state religion,” said Rocco Buttiglione, the Italian politician whose campaign for the position of European commissioner for justice was disrupted by the European parliament last year after his description of homosexuality as a sin.

“We are concerned for the destiny of European nations and their role in the modern world,” read a statement from the recent Russian Orthodox-Roman Catholic conference in Vienna. “Without the inspiration of profound moral principles characteristic of our two European religious traditions and of many secular schools of thought, the West faces grave danger.” The criticism is not just limited to Catholic or Orthodox: the French Protestant Federation recently warned of the climate of “secularist zeal” undermining all faiths.

But the movement may also be responding to broader signs of a revival of

faith, particularly in intellectual and media circles. *Le Monde*, France's largest-circulation paper, last year launched a high-priced monthly on the world of religion and religious belief, while the European Commission's 2005 European Values Study found that 74 percent of Europeans still believe in God or in a “life spirit.” Though church attendance in countries like Sweden, France, and Holland hovers at around 10-15 percent in urban areas, in countries such as Poland, Switzerland, and Portugal the number is estimated at between 60 and 75 percent. In Orthodox countries like Russia and Greece, that number is about 50 percent.

The idea of church unity as a force against secular corruption first assumed an organized identity in 1965 in the form of Pro Oriente, the Catholic organization that established itself as the unofficial link between these two halves of Christianity. The brainchild of the late Austrian Cardinal Franz König, the organization began underground—and often dangerous—contacts between Rome and the non-communist Eastern Orthodox Churches, making König something of an unofficial diplomat of the Vatican to the Soviet Bloc and a legend in his own time. The seeds of reconciliation had been planted: at the time of the second Vatican Council, Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople terminated their excommunication of each other.

What is slowly being reconciled between the two churches goes back across centuries to the history of the organization of church doctrine, a narrative that is as fascinating as it is obscure in modern education and cultural awareness. Generally speaking, what we understand today as Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity as two distinct church bodies is the product of a centuries-long gradual estrangement over theological disputes culminating in July 1054, the date of mutual excommunication. While this rupture is often pre-

sented as the result of a fallout over the *filioque*—the concept of the Holy Spirit proceeding from “the Father,” as Orthodox maintain, versus “the Father and the Son,” as Roman Catholicism believes — this doctrinal point was a separate detail within the growing issue of Rome’s assertion of the supremacy and infallibility of the pope as successor to Peter the Apostle. The Orthodox Church, recognizing no central authority and organized across autocephalous bodies, refused to accept this papal concept.

To this day, “1054” remains a particularly sensitive point in any discussion about who separated from whom, the very question implying that one of the two churches represents the original Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. A Roman Catholic, for instance, might assert that the primacy of Peter the Apostle and the association of Peter with Rome is the true basis of the foundation of the universal Christian church. The Orthodox Christian, for his part, would maintain that his church is the direct inheritor of an older apostolic tradition that pre-dates Peter’s arrival in Rome, one that grew out of the original patriarchates of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem. (Constantinople and Rome came later.)

These are all intense, hair-splitting, often aggravating details to a modern reader. And yet it is the stuff that once determined imperial ally from adversary, economic partner from *terra non granta*, banished heretic from exalted saint, and most significantly, Christianity’s chosen beliefs from its rejected ones. To study the Ecumenical Councils on Christianity between 325 to 869 AD is to see a series of incredible debates that were almost entirely concerned, with almost obsessive passion, with the definition of the nature of Christ, papal authority, and the morality of the veneration of icons. Intensely intellectual summit meetings, presided over by a

total of 11 emperors across six centuries, lent spectacular drama to this hunt for Christian truth, bringing together the greatest Hellenized thinkers of the day, rebellious, brilliant church personalities, ferocious Byzantine autokratoroi, defiant Roman popes—all across a late Roman and medieval backdrop with its civil and imperial wars along the way.

Intricately, patiently, these councils resulted in the foundation of Eastern and Western segments of the church, differences that were theological, political, and cultural. While certain decisions have become universal to both—the Nicene Creed, the concept of the Trinitarian nature of Christ, and the honor of the Theotokos (Mother of God) for example—others formed the seeds of estrangement. For example, Constantinople’s assertion over other patriarchates was rejected by Rome as early as the 4th century. By the time of the last ecumenical council in the 9th century, the papal controversy in the form of the so-called Photian Schism—a contest over the legitimacy of Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople whose ascension was rejected by Rome—had grown predominant.

The Roman Catholic Church accepted subsequent Councils—a total of 21 between the 4th and 20th centuries—as also ecumenical, convened, and attended by the authorities of the Roman Church after the schism of 1054. These Councils, the last of which is the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), are not accepted by the Orthodox Church as bearing the authority that the seven truly Ecumenical Councils possessed, and no decisions of the Roman Catholic Councils have any bearing on the Orthodox Church. However, this is not to say that there were no earlier attempts at reconciliation. Between the 13th and 15th centuries there were three major attempts between the Greek patriarchate and Rome to effect a reunion. Some 70 years

after the Fourth Crusade, a Council was held at Lyon in 1274 as an appeal to the Patriarchate of Constantinople over the issue of the papacy, and then again at the Council of Constance in 1418, in another attempt to end divisions in the church.

It was only the Council of Florence/Ferrara in June 1439 where an official, if short-lived, union with that patriarchate was reached. The Greek Church accepted the Latin view of the *filioque*, the primacy of the pope, and partial agreement on the concept of purgatory—an extraordinary magnanimity on the part of that church. In June 1439, an agreement was signed but rejected by a broader Eastern synod and apparent popular dissent. Notably, the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine Palaeologus, remained committed to the union until the fall of the Constantinople. For on Dec. 12, 1452 the union of the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Church was proclaimed in Constantinople in the presence of the papal legate and Patriarch Gregory. A little less than six months later, the city was destroyed and pillaged by Ottoman Turks.

How interesting, then, that a little over 500 years later Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy should come so close to reconciliation, this time as Turkey waits at Europe’s border for acceptance and as the continent searches for self-definition after a century of wars and collapsed empires. Pope and patriarchs will for some time, perhaps for all time, remain on separate sides of Europe’s historical and cultural map. But Christianity today, through this process of reconciliation, has never so beautifully demonstrated a sense of unity in what was and what shall remain—despite naysayers and doomsdayers, secularism and fanaticism—the incredible foundation of Western civilization. ■

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Defining Democracy Down

Engaging an enemy diplomatically used to be quiet business, while committing to alliances was a matter of public debate. The Bush administration has changed that.

By Leon Hadar

IN THE GOOD OLD DAYS of American diplomacy, attempting to open channels to a foe would become the stuff of behind-the-scenes negotiations conducted far away from the maddening media so as to transcend the passions and prejudices of domestic politics. At the same time, deciding whether to commit the United States to come to the defense of foreign nations—those entangling alliances that President George Washington warned against in his Farewell Address—has been always the focus of open and heated congressional debates. The logic operating in both cases was simple: if you wanted to avoid being drawn into unnecessary and costly wars, use covert diplomacy to defuse tensions and win congressional approval of a military commitment.

But under President George W. Bush, the United States seems to have entered a post-diplomatic age when it comes to opening a dialogue with an adversary, as highlighted by the White House's recent decision to turn what could have been a potential detente with Iran into another media-spinning operation. At the same time, the Bush administration is also entangling the United States in a murky alliance with a foreign friend, committing us to protect Israel from an Iranian attack, a dramatic step that has received no attention on Capitol Hill.

For several years, I've been promoting the idea that Washington adopt a realpolitik approach to dealing with Iran, including opening a direct diplo-

matic dialogue with Tehran aimed at resolving some of the major differences between the two governments. In particular, I've been critical of the Bush administration's neocon-driven policy of promoting regime change in Iran and of its rejection of diplomatic overtures from Iran. Indeed, in an article in these pages I called on President Bush to follow the example of another hawkish Republican president, Richard Nixon, who reshaped global politics by going to communist China, and adopt a similar strategy by going to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

But drawing a historical analogy between the recent move by the Bush-Rice team to agree to talk with Iran (under certain conditions) and the decision by the Nixon-Kissinger crew to open diplomatic negotiations with China is like comparing Ann Coulter to H.L. Mencken.

The secret negotiations with China were a major step in a coherent strategy aimed at forming a Sino-American alliance to counter the Soviets. Nixon and Henry Kissinger were determined to re-establish diplomatic links with Beijing and ensured that their project would succeed by conducting secret negotiations with the Chinese and preventing the powerful China Lobby from sabotaging them. The Nixon-Kissinger policy was like a powerful bulldozer running over all the obstacles as it pressed ahead toward the final destination.

But Bush and Rice resemble the disoriented drivers of a broken-down vehicle who are not sure what address they should be looking for. After driving around town for hours, they are relieved to discover a gas station where they hope to get some directions. Indeed, when it comes to the Bush administration's policy towards Iran, much of what is described as diplomacy is nothing more than an attempt to muddle through one crisis after another, that is, to come up with ad hoc responses that reflect the existing political pressures at home and the balance of power abroad while trying to spin the latest developments as another example of "regaining the diplomatic initiative," the equivalent of a "tipping point" in Iraq.

In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, talk in Washington turned to regime change in Tehran. In fact, at that stage Washington dismissed diplomatic advances from Iran and expressed confidence that the Iranian people would soon topple the mullahs. When Iraq turned into a mess and the Iranians elected a populist president, the military option was placed on the backburner while the Europeans were encouraged to negotiate with the Iranians on their alleged nuclear program. The Americans were hoping that the failure of the talks with the EU-3 (Britain, France, Germany) would create the conditions for winning support from the UN Security Council for punishing Iran. The talks indeed collapsed—but then rising oil prices helped to strengthen

Iran's bargaining power and made it less likely that Russia and China would support sanctions.

It was in that stage that the perplexed U.S. drivers saw the lights of a gas station, and since real men don't ask for directions, Bush told Condi to get out of the car and find out where they should make the next turn. With Britain's Tony Blair and Germany's Angela Merkel playing the role of the friendly attendants, Bush's diplomatic sidekick discovered that Military Drive, Sanctions Road, and No-Direct-U.S.-Negotiations-With-Iran Alley were all leading to dead ends. If anything, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's letter to Bush, which was dismissed by the Americans as nothing more than a publicity stunt, proved to be a successful publicity stunt that increased the pressure on Bush and Rice to "do something" just as wise men in Washington (including Dr. K himself) were suggesting that the time had come to talk with Iran. That explains why Bush and Rice are now turning on to Direct Negotiations Avenue while portraying it as a major diplomatic triumph.

But this route will probably lead to another diplomatic dead end since the Americans and the Iranians are entering into the negotiations with totally different expectations. The Bushies have yet to devise a coherent strategy that could lead to a deal involving not only the nuclear issue but common interests in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. Iran hopes that Washington will recognize it as a major player in the Persian Gulf, an idea that challenges the notion of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. What Bush and Rice want is for Iran to "do a Libya" and give up its entire nuclear program in exchange for some carrots. That is not going to happen. And it is certainly difficult to imagine how the two sides would be able to reach a compromise with the talks taking place as the world is

watching, including the powerful Israel lobby, which has been a driving force behind the efforts to isolate Tehran.

Israel's concerns have been taken into consideration as the Bushies have muddled toward the talks with Iran. While the Americans have indicated that they won't pursue a military option in dealing with Iran for the duration of the talks, the Israelis have warned of an Iranian "initial nuclear capability" between 2005 and 2007 and maintain that they will use all means available to prevent that from happening. Since Tehran takes it for granted that any Israeli decision to attack its nuclear sites would receive a U.S. green light, Washington needs to ensure that the Israelis would not do just that and force the United States into a military confrontation it wants to avoid, at least for now. It is in this context, as a signal to Israel to stay its hand, that one should consider President Bush's recent statements that the United States is ready to protect Israel in case it is attacked by Iran. "The threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel," Bush declared in March. "That's a threat, a serious threat. It's a threat to world peace; it's a threat, in essence, to a strong alliance. I made it clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally, Israel." Bush reiterated the same point during a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Washington in June. "Israel is a close friend and ally of the United States, and in the event of any attack on Israel, the United States will come to Israel's aid," Bush said. "The United States is strongly committed, and I'm strongly committed, to the security of Israel as a vibrant, Jewish state."

Unlike NATO, Japan, and South Korea, the United States doesn't have a formal military alliance with Israel, so it's amazing that Bush's stated commitment to "use military might to protect

our ally, Israel" received so little attention in Washington—or for that matter in Israel, whose leaders have always stressed an aversion to entrusting their nation's security to outsiders, including the United States. Some analysts have raised the possibility that Bush's vow to defend Israel from an attack by Iran is part of an effort by Washington to persuade Israel to refrain from officially declaring itself a nuclear power if and when Iran goes nuclear. To put it differently, instead of moving to create a regional deterrence system with Iran—the approximate parallel would be India-Pakistan, both of which gained the bomb in 1998—the Bush administration is hoping that Israeli leaders would agree to "accept a U.S. pledge of protection from a nuclear Iran under a broad American deterrence umbrella" and thus make it less likely that other Middle Eastern countries would decide to acquire nuclear military capability, speculated *National Journal's* Paul Starobin.

Whatever the Bush administration is contemplating with regard to the evolving Israel-Iran nuclear game of chicken—blunt warning to Iran's leaders? Threatening to retaliate against Iran if it attacks Israel? Providing Israel with a nuclear umbrella?—there are no indications that it is ready to consult Congress as it muddles toward a very costly military commitment whose parameters are not clear. Is it possible that Bush is not even considering the implications of his new commitments to Israel and is just trying to buy some time for talks with Iran so as to ensure that resolving the nuclear crisis with Iran and the mess in Iraq will be left to his successor? Isn't it time that those inquiring minds on Capitol Hill would want to know the answers to these questions? ■

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Arts & Letters

FILM

[Cars]

Gentlemen, Start Your Computers

By Steve Sailer

"CARS," the G-rated computer-generated cartoon from the normally reliable John Lasseter of Pixar Animation Studios, takes place in an alternate universe: an America populated only by talking vehicles. Owen Wilson blandly voices Lightning McQueen, a rookie NASCAR racecar who, on his way to California for the climactic contest of the stock-car season, gets waylaid in the Arizona burgh of Radiator Springs, a once-hopping Route 66 stopping point that has been Nowheresville since the new interstate bypassed it in 1966. Its rusty but truehearted denizens, such as the town doctor, a 1951 Hudson Hornet voiced by Paul Newman, teach him important life lessons.

Although the Pixar animators do everything imaginable to infuse the cars with personalities, automobiles still prove ill-chosen agents for two hours of anthropomorphizing. In particular, Luigi and Guido, the Italian-stereotype Fiats working at the Pirelli tire shop, suffer from the autos' lack of hands with which to gesticulate vociferously. A more subtle deficiency of this kids' movie is that there are no kids in the factory-built world of "Cars."

And then there's the fanatically precise scenery. One of Jorge Luis Borges's funnier conceits was the fictional Chinese emperor so adamant about his imperial

cartographers providing more detail that he eventually had them draw a map of China exactly as large as China itself. "Cars" is similarly unclear on the concept of artistic abstraction. Back in 1995's "Toy Story," Lasseter's computer-graphic techniques were charming in their creative simplification and exaggeration of reality. Now the technology has evolved to where, through a prodigious expenditure of talent, time, and money, the CGI desert in "Cars" looks virtually as photo-realistically genuine as the actual desert in, say, the modestly budgeted "Road Warrior"—and, therefore, almost as pointless as the emperor's 1:1 scale map.

When enough billions are on the table, perhaps even Lasseter, one of the true heroes of American popular culture, can lose sight of what has made his art effective.

Pixar's history is famously heartwarming. Purchased by Apple founder Steve Jobs in 1986, Pixar first gained notice that year with Lasseter's 150-second short about mother and baby desk lamps, "Luxo Jr." Two decades ago, everybody knew that computer animation was the next big thing, but it was then skull-crushingly slow to create. Despite the tedium of waiting for 1980s processors, Lasseter infused human warmth into his computer images. Ultimately, Lasseter's 15 years of effort paid off with the superb blockbuster "Toy Story."

Pixar became the reincarnation of Walt Disney's old studio—a specialty shop crafting only high quality, non-edgy 3-D family films, such as "Finding Nemo" and "The Incredibles." Finally, last January, Jobs sold Pixar to Disney for \$7.4 billion, with Lasseter as the prize human asset.

Will the money ruin Pixar? It's disquieting that the Disney 2-D animation renaissance that began with "The Little Mermaid" in 1989 and hit its peak with

"Beauty and the Beast" sputtered out after "The Lion King" became a billion-dollar property in 1994. Animators who once had few cares besides wowing each other with imagination and comedy in their dingy warehouse in Glendale quickly aged into profit centers nearly paralyzed with fiscal responsibility in their new architectural showcase at Disney headquarters in Burbank.

Although Pixar films use the highest technology, the company sends numerous employees each year to Robert McKee's screenwriting seminars (which were parodied in Charlie Kaufman's "Adaptation"). McKee gets his traditionalist ideas about storytelling from Aristotle and Golden Age Hollywood films like "Casablanca." McKee's adages have served Pixar well in making their films focus on narrative and character rather than techno-nerdisms or one-liners.

Perhaps Pixar's McKee formula may be reaching diminishing returns, though, as "Cars" turns out to have the same plot as the 1991 Michael J. Fox romantic comedy "Doc Hollywood." Moreover, McKee's emphasis on drama has been taken too much to heart in "Cars," as the six screenwriters forgot to include any jokes until the hilarious end credits. Stock-car racing, which is a sort of covert ethnic-pride rally for people who aren't allowed to hold ethnic-pride rallies, is treated too reverently for a film that purports to be a comedy.

With luck, though, "Cars" will turn out to be a minor detour for Lasseter and Pixar. Although lacking inspiration, "Cars" remains an above-average film, delivering intelligent detailing—because it still takes 17 hours to render each frame, years are available for fine-tuning—patriotic nostalgia, and uplifting sentiments about teamwork and humility. ■

Rated G.

BOOKS

[*Conservatives Without Conscience*, John Dean, Viking, 288 pages]

Conformity Without Conscience

By Austin Bramwell

SOMETHING IS ROTTEN in the state of conservatism, says John Dean in *Conservatives Without Conscience*. Today's conservatives are "hostile and mean-spirited," "vengeful, pitiless, exploitive, manipulative, dishonest, cheaters, prejudiced, mean-spirited [again], militant, nationalistic, and two-faced," not to mention "enemies of freedom, antidemocratic, antiequality, highly prejudiced, mean-spirited [once more], power hungry, Machiavellian, and amoral." Mental handicaps such as "intolerance of ambiguity, need for certainty or structure in life, overreaction to threats, and a disposition to dominate others" turn them ineluctably into "authoritarians" and "social dominators." Unless stopped, Dean warns, conservatives "will take American democracy where no freedom-loving person would want it to go."

Those who buy the conclusion that Dean all but assumes—namely, that movement conservatives are destroying the Republic—will find all this wonderfully cathartic. No need to troll the internet for anti-Republican Party talking points: *Conservatives Without Conscience* hits them all. The GOP has shifted to the extreme right and imposed virtual one-party rule; evangelicals want to install a theocracy and tear down the wall of separation between church and state; the Bush administration has stripped citizens of their civil liberties and emasculated the other branches of

government; social conservatives hate women and gays and want to reduce them to second-class citizens; conservative legal scholars, merely by questioning the theory of judicial supremacy (which Dean confuses with the power of judicial review), threaten the independence of the courts. The right wing gets away with these and other crimes by being a bunch of hypocritical, sanctimonious jerks.

Humorlessly posing as a disinterested champion of the public weal, Dean defends his unkind words for conservatives by invoking the theory of the "authoritarian personality." First introduced by the neo-Freudian Theodor Adorno in the 1940s but largely discredited by the 1970s, the theory evidently still has its champions, who have carried on a small, if obscure, research industry in its name. Their work does not appear to have earned widespread acceptance among academic psychologists. No matter: in Dean's mind, as he spends the bulk of *Conservatives Without Conscience* arguing, the theory of the authoritarian personality establishes the malevolence of conservatives as scientific fact.

To anyone not blind with ideological rage, however, the theory has patent flaws. The whole thing turns out to be rather trivial, notwithstanding all the portentous claims made on the theory's behalf. Take, for example, the work of Dean's favorite guru, a University of Manitoba psychologist named Robert Altemeyer. Altemeyer has spent a career administering a questionnaire he calls the "Right Wing Authoritarianism Survey," in which he asks subjects to agree or disagree with statements such as "the old-fashioned ways and old-fashioned values still show the best way to live" or "there is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse." After collecting the results, Altemeyer goes on to find that those who score high on the "RWA" scale also tend to be political conservatives. Well, yeah: the questions themselves do little more than elicit conservative or liberal attitudes in the first place. The RWA scale shows only that conservative beliefs correlate well with ... other conservative beliefs. Call it science if you will—Dean

does—but it certainly hasn't much in the way of explanatory power.

Furthermore, to the extent that the RWA survey measures anything at all, it measures nothing close to what Altemeyer thinks it does. Is it true, for example, that "Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us"? Maybe Altemeyer thinks that anyone who answers "yes" pines for a charismatic nationalist leader *a la*—who else?—Adolf Hitler. But, in fact, any effective political leader could fit the description. In the civil-rights era, for example, did not our country "desperately need" (to rectify injustice) a "mighty leader" (he certainly had a large following) such as the sainted Martin Luther King Jr. who was willing to "do what it takes" (organize marches and boycotts) to "stamp out" (end) "sinfulness" (segregation) and "radical new ways" (racist backlash)? Logical consistency would compel nearly everyone to agree with the statement, no matter how provocatively phrased. If it turns out that only conservatives say that they agree, this shows only that conservatives understand the meaning of words.

The RWA survey teems with other such statements, many of almost irredeemable silliness. Take, for example, "God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed." Well, who could disagree with that? If God's laws are by definition perfectly good, then by *modus ponens* one should follow them whether God exists or not. The statement is as self-evidently true as "All unicorns are horses." Curiously, however, Altemeyer finds that left-wingers tend to disagree with the statement. One may conclude, therefore, that leftist ideology tends to incapacitate logic—an important result, perhaps worthy of further research, but not the one Altemeyer was going for.

Meanwhile, the RWA survey seems specifically calculated to avoid identifying authoritarian attitudes on the Left. Altemeyer claims to have looked for left-wing authoritarians but failed to find them. If

so, this does not speak well of his scientific imagination. One could probably find left-wing authoritarians in an afternoon by asking subjects if they agree that “those with intolerant or bigoted views shouldn’t be allowed to express them in public” or “God condemns anyone who is judgmental or intolerant of people who have different religions or lifestyles.” Instead, the “left-wing” statements on the RWA survey—e.g., “there’s nothing wrong with nudist camps”—merely afford subjects an opportunity to show how free-thinking they are. Not once does the RWA survey attempt to draw out the myriad conventions and prejudices that characterize left-wing ideologies.

Finally, Altemeyer’s research never comes close to demonstrating that “authoritarian” attitudes, as measured on his survey, actually predict authoritarian behavior—or any other kind of behavior, for that matter, whether good or bad. (Hilariously, Dean himself, in a passage on how hypocritical conservatives are, cites research showing that conservatives tend to behave just like everyone else.) Altemeyer’s favorite proof of right-wing turpitude comes from something he designed called the “Global Change Game.” Altemeyer does not explain the game in detail, but, essentially, participants control various regions of the globe and then make decisions (e.g., wage war, allocate “resources,” restrain population growth) about what their respective regions will do. Apparently, when only RWAs played the game, “after 40 years, not counting nuclear war, 2.1 billion people had died.”

Frightening, no? Only until one reads that the 2.1 billion figure was calculated “according to a complicated formulae used in the game to take into account the consequences of war, long-term unemployment, malnutrition and poor medical infrastructures.” In other words, the results of any game simply reflect the designers’ assumptions as to how the world really works. Altemeyer takes it for granted, for example, that foreign aid from wealthy countries reduces suffering in poor countries, notwithstanding the contrary theory

that foreign aid makes matters worse by entrenching kleptocracies and rewarding government failure. Hence, the hapless high RWAs who don’t see the world the way Altemeyer does necessarily fail when they play the game. The Global Change Game, in short, proves only that Altemeyer’s political views differ from those of conservatives. As he is hardly reticent about making this point to begin with, it is unclear why he needed a “sophisticated simulation” to prove it.

So much for the theory of the authoritarian personality. Whatever its scientific merits, as a systematic explanation of political behavior it is plainly bogus. The theory’s implications for political theory, moreover, are chillingly, shall we say, authoritarian. “Probably about 20 to 25 percent of the adult American population,” Altemeyer tells Dean, “is so right-wing authoritarian, so scared, so self-righteous, so ill-informed, and so dogmatic that nothing you say or do will change their minds. They would march America into a dictatorship and probably feel that things had improved as a result ... they are not going to let up and they are not going to go away.” Let us pray that nobody takes Altemeyer’s views seriously. Personally, I would rather not live in a time when the conviction became popular that a minority of citizens threatened the well-being of everyone else. Altemeyer, I fear, would march his country into a dictatorship and probably feel that things had improved as a result.

What remains of *Conservatives Without Conscience* is a series of profiles of such figures as Phyllis Schlafly, G. Gordon Liddy, and Newt Gingrich, all of whom Dean diagnoses as classic authoritarians. Although I cannot assess the accuracy of his research, I would not recommend putting much confidence in it. As it happens—full disclosure here—Dean includes me and my wife in his rogue’s gallery of right-wingers, and, while he does not treat us as harshly as he does, say, Pat Robertson, he bungles my argument made in these pages that Congress has the power to define marriage as between a man and a woman. Dean says that I “relied on the same

approach employed by an uglier version of conservatism in a past era: white supremacy,” yet my argument assumed the very opposite. Given that the Constitution protects the right to marry against infringement by the states, I wrote, Congress can enforce that right by preventing the states from redefining the institution of marriage out of existence. In other words, I rejected the segregationists’ argument that the Constitution does not protect the right to marry. Since Dean is too intelligent to have made such a mistake, I can only assume that his purpose was to put the words “a young conservative” (that’s me) and “white supremacy” in the same sentence. Not very sporting.

For all the book’s flaws, Dean has addressed a timely and important topic. The conservative movement has become a powerful force in America; for that reason alone, one would like to see how and why it works. Dean’s thesis, however, that nefarious authoritarians suddenly overwhelmed it, adds almost nothing to our understanding. He may as well have said that conservatism was taken over by zombies.

A more insightful book might say the following. First, the conservative movement in large part exists to promote intellectual conformity. Few writers or scholars affiliated with the movement care to risk their sinecures (or their institutions’ funding) by disagreeing too vociferously with the official movement position. Consciously or unconsciously, right-wing writers instead tend to suppress thoughts that may be deemed too eccentric or independent. Meanwhile, the movement selects and promotes the careers of young writers whose primary qualification consists of believing *ab initio* what the movement tells them to believe. One should not be surprised, given this incentive structure, if the movement has become increasingly bland, notwithstanding the usual humbug about how intellectually superior the Right is these days. Blandness is part of the institutional design.

Second, those at the top of the conservative movement have wide discretion to set its movement’s official positions.

Bedrock or founding principles, whatever they may be, play very little role in determining what policies the conservative movement will embrace. Whatever may be said of the Bush administration's policies in Iraq, for example, they were surely not deduced from immutable conservative principles. Nevertheless, the signature achievement of the conservative movement in the past decade has been to rally—or, perhaps more accurately, manufacture—public support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. With just one or two changes in personnel, however, one could easily imagine events turning out very differently. Reckless or prudent, thoughtful or ignorant, the opinion-mongers at the top set the movement line; the other constituents—the donors, the directors, and the other writers and the consumers of opinion—then accept and promulgate whatever positions the movement tells them to.

This is, of course, precisely how ideology works. In one of the better passages in *Conservatives Without Conscience*, Dean rejects the view—upon reflection, almost patently false—that “conservatism” as now understood is not an ideology. He rightly senses that conservatism, in the philosophic sense, does not define the conservative movement; rather, the conservative movement now defines conservatism, at least as far as the media and the public understand the term. In Dean's model, however, conservative elites respond to the (dangerous) psychological demands of the conservative masses. It is much more likely that, on the contrary, the conservative masses respond to the demands of a handful of movement elites. An open question remains as to who, exactly, constitutes the elite, especially as movement institutions that once sought to change minds now passively disseminate opinions devised by newer, more vigorous outlets. In any case, it will take another book to provide a better understanding of how the conservative movement actually functions. ■

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[*The Big Ripoff: How Big Business and Big Government Steal Your Money*, Timothy P. Carney, John Wiley & Sons, 304 pages]

Partners in Crime

By Bruce Bartlett

ONE OF THE MOST common media myths is that Big Business is relentlessly in favor of the free market. Corporate lobbyists, we are told almost daily, use their campaign contributions mainly to prompt Congress to get government off business's back and gut regulations that protect consumers. Without the federal government to defend us from Big Business, we would all be at its mercy.

Those who actually observe Big Business at work in Washington on a day-to-day basis, however, have long known that this is nothing but a caricature with little basis in truth. The reality is that Big Business is and always has been one of the principal proponents of Big Government in the U.S. They are not so much enemies as partners—occasionally competitors, but never really enemies—each using the other to serve its own ends.

Any conservative activist in Washington or the state capitals can probably cite chapter and verse about being betrayed by corporate lobbyists, who sold out the free market in a nanosecond when they calculated that it would add to the bottom line. And this is true even in cases where some proposed law or regulation hurt every business. What the lobbyists will often do is calculate that their business will be hurt a little bit less—perhaps because they have managed to slip some exception or loophole for themselves into the law or regulation—thereby giving them a competitive advantage.

In *The Big Ripoff*, journalist Tim Carney documents the symbiotic relationship between Big Government and Big Business and how they work together to squeeze taxpayers and consumers. It is must-reading for every con-

servative activist, especially those who must work with the business community.

The idea that business and government have more in common than not was observed more than 200 years ago by Adam Smith, the wisest of all economists. “The interest of the dealers,” he wrote, “is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow competition, is always the interest of the dealers.”

Government regulation, Smith went on to observe in *The Wealth of Nations*, always restricted competition, with the result that businesses were able to raise prices. “To levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens,” as he put it. Therefore, government should be extremely cautious about imposing new regulations, especially those requested by the businessmen themselves.

Carney points out that many of the government's most onerous regulations were indeed imposed at the behest of the businesses that were regulated. One of the earliest examples was the meat packers, who requested government regulation after their industry had been exposed by muckraking journalist Upton Sinclair in 1906. He documented the unspeakably filthy conditions in which raw meat was handled in those days in his book *The Jungle*.

The meat packers quickly recognized that only government inspections would get consumers to buy meat again, even from meat packers who had always observed sanitary methods. Although their costs would rise, so would their sales in the long run. In 1932, Sinclair lamented the fact that the meat inspection system instituted by Teddy Roosevelt “is maintained and paid for by the people of the United States for the benefit of the packers.”

Citing research by historian Gabriel Kolko, Carney points to a number of businesses and industries that have solicited government regulation in order to suppress competition and improve their profits. These include trucking, airlines, steel, and railroads.

In the 1970s, under pressure to reduce inflation, Jimmy Carter supported deregulation, which eliminated the Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, and other regulatory agencies. The result was a sharp decline in the cost of travel and of shipping goods by truck, rail, and air.

Of course, one consequence has been chaos in industries where profits used to be as regular as clockwork. For 50 years the same few airline companies controlled all air travel in the United States. Airline ticket prices were high, routes limited, and innovation nonexistent. Today, most of the old airlines are gone, new ones pop up almost daily, travelers have a vast selection, and they can often fly for a pittance with tickets purchased on the Internet. Even without adjusting for inflation, the full-fare tickets on many routes are cheaper today than they were 30 years ago.

But in spite of the enormous success of deregulation, there are still a lot of important industries where it has not yet occurred, at least meaningfully. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, cries out for deregulation. The existing drug regulatory system means that it costs hundreds of millions of dollars to bring a single new drug to market, thus almost all drugs are produced by a handful of very large corporations.

There are also constant pressures for new regulations, often disguised as deregulation. In the telecommunications area, there is an ongoing struggle between telephone companies and cable providers to get the government to tilt regulations in their favor. Unfortunately, the issues are often so technical that it is almost impossible to figure out where the true interests of consumers lie. Consequently, free-market advocates can be found on both sides.

In one of his more fascinating chapters, Carney explains why tobacco giant Philip Morris has pushed for regulation of cigarettes. It was the only way it could protect itself from lawsuits brought by greedy trial lawyers—apologies for the redundancy—and restrict entry into the business so that Philip Morris could raise its

prices enough to pay the enormous financial settlement that had been extorted from it. Thus, despite the fact that it has paid out tens of billions of dollars to the states and alleged victims of smoking, not to mention all the lawyers who became multimillionaires in the process, the company's profits have gone up.

Carney also shows that the Enron scandal was not the result of lax government regulation. Contrary to the liberal media portrait of that company as one that was pressing the Bush administration to reduce regulation, Enron was actually pushing for more environmental regulation in order to add to its business. The company actively promoted the Kyoto Protocol on global warming because it would have established a worldwide mechanism for trading carbon-emissions credits that Enron wanted to create markets for and profit from.

Tax policy is another area where businesses are not shy about pushing for special deals that come at the expense of ordinary taxpayers. At the state level, local businesses often lobby for higher taxes to finance roads, bridges, and such. Big Business also supports the estate tax because it helps eliminate potential competitors. Small businesses often end up being sold off to pay the estate tax, so they never can become big.

Lastly, Carney reviews cases of what is often called corporate welfare—instances in which the federal government hands out direct subsidies to businesses. One example is the Ex-Im Bank, which provides subsidized loans to a handful of big exporting companies like Boeing. Subsidies for agriculture mostly go to big agribusinesses, not family farms. There are also tax subsidies, such as that for ethanol made from corn, which could not compete with petroleum except that no gasoline tax is applied to ethanol used as motor fuel.

But perhaps the most outrageous case of corporate welfare is the sugar program, which keeps out cheap foreign sugar mainly to benefit one Florida family that controls most domestic sugarcane production. As a result, consumers pay substantially more for everything

that contains sugar, while at the same time many farmers in Latin America, where sugar can be produced far more cheaply than here, are impoverished.

In all, Carney has written an important book about an important subject. It lays out a roadmap for ways in which Congress can both cut the budget and improve the economy at the same time. The lessons of deregulation in the 1970s are still valid and could be applied to other industries as well.

Once upon a time, Republicans in Congress vowed to cut corporate welfare, recognizing, correctly, that they will never be able to cut social welfare programs unless they have developed budgetary credibility by showing that they are also willing to slash spending for programs that benefit their constituents in the business community.

Sadly, it has been years since I heard a Republican in Congress talk seriously about cutting corporate welfare. These days, they are more likely to talk about creating new subsidies. And rather than reducing government regulations, the Bush administration has added greatly to them, especially in the financial area with the onerous Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which was enacted in reaction to the Enron scandal. Yet even if the law had been on the books before Enron, it would have done nothing whatsoever to prevent the company from doing all the things that got it into trouble. Now all public corporations must jump through a lot of unnecessary regulatory hoops, greatly raising their costs without doing anything to meaningfully protect investors.

I would suggest that perhaps the greatest potential readership for *The Big Ripoff* may be among liberals and Democrats. For them, demanding cuts in corporate welfare is a twofer, helping them establish credibility on the budget while embarrassing Republicans at the same time, not one of whom would dare to defend corporate welfare or government regulation in the bright light of day. ■

Bruce Bartlett is the author of Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy.

[*Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*, Charles Peña, Potomac Books, 240 pages]

The Art of Un-War

By Ivan Eland

IF PRESIDENT George W. Bush had hired Charles Peña to formulate U.S. policy against terrorism, the country would be much safer and the president would probably not be experiencing popularity akin to that of O.J. Simpson. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the president's signature policy initiative, has dragged his poll numbers down—probably permanently—into the 30s. Peña's book provides much evidence, however, that the stakes for the country are much higher than this.

The author demonstrates that the Iraq War has impeded neutralization of the main threat to the United States—al-Qaeda—and, in fact, has made this threat worse by fanning the flames of radical Islam and providing a more effective training ground for terrorists than did the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets during the 1980s. Others have made similar arguments, but Peña provides much hard evidence to demonstrate the thesis. Yet the real value of the book is that Peña does what many authors fail to do—take this argument to its logical conclusion.

Many Democratic and liberal critics of the Iraq War fail to realize that the Bush administration's foreign policy is not that different from Bill Clinton's and other Democratic and Republican presidents since World War II. All of those presidents ran a policy of overseas interventionism—of which the Iraq War is only the latest episode. Current Bush critics are many of the same people who supported Clinton's interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the near invasion of Haiti. But Peña astutely realizes that the interventionist U.S. foreign

policy of past presidents helped cause the rise and ideological success of al-Qaeda in the Islamic world.

The author notes that Clausewitz said all energies should be focused on the enemy's "center of gravity," on which everything the adversary does depends. Peña cites Michael Scheuer, the former CIA analyst who was in charge of tracking Osama bin Laden, as saying that al-Qaeda has no center of gravity in the traditional sense—no economy, cities, homeland, power grids, or conventional military—but uses U.S. policies that enrage Muslims as a substitute. Peña relates that the 9/11 Commission and numerous polls in the Islamic world show that radical Islamists do not hate the United States for its freedoms, way of life, culture, accomplishments, or values, but rather for its policies. In fact, bin Laden's writings and statements focus on U.S. policies toward Muslims, and he specifically denies that he attacks the United States because it is free.

The author explores military options (for example, adding more Special Operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles and not expelling sorely needed specialized linguists for violating the military's "don't ask don't tell" policies toward homosexuals) and improvements in homeland security (for example, government precautions against the threat of handheld anti-aircraft weapons and the protection of critical dams) to fight terrorism, but he argues that reconfigured military forces and domestic security enhancements will provide only limited protection against future terrorist attacks. Peña notes that defending against terrorists is a Maginot Line. Determined terrorists will find a way around any set of defenses. And as the dangerous situation in Baghdad shows, heavy security does not necessarily prevent terrorism.

Unlike other authors, both neoconservative and Wilsonian liberal, Peña is not afraid to say that given the U.S. government's limited ability to deter, prevent, or foil terrorist attacks in the target-rich domestic environment, a more restrained foreign policy is a must

to remove the motivation for radical Islamists to attack America. The implication of Peña's work is that overseas empire does not promote security but instead undermines it.

Very few other analyses on terrorism reach this obvious conclusion. They focus on tactical ways to apprehend or kill terrorists—using intelligence, law enforcement, or military means—or improvements in homeland security designed to guard U.S. infrastructure. They neglect the all-important motivation for terrorist attacks. Even publications that do admit U.S. foreign policy is the root cause of anti-American terrorism avoid recommending a change in that policy. In fact, the White House's 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* notes the relationship but then says that homeland security seeks to deny terrorists the option to attack U.S. territory, thus providing a "secure foundation for America's ongoing global engagement." As Peña notes, maintaining the U.S. global military presence seems to have become an end in itself. The White House has it exactly backwards. U.S. foreign and national-security policy should protect American citizens, territory, and society, not hold them hostage to preserve the American empire.

In contrast, when focusing on terrorists' motivation, Peña unearths some facts that few authors mention. For all the talk by the Bush administration and the media about state sponsorship of terrorism by Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Peña points out that these states supported terrorist groups that no longer focused their attacks on U.S. targets. In fact, Peña shows that of the 36 foreign terrorist organizations and 38 other terrorist groups designated by the State Department, very few attack U.S. targets.

One of those true threats to the United States—and the only one with global reach that can attack the U.S. homeland—is al-Qaeda. But Peña notes that al-Qaeda only attacks the United States because the United States has taken sides in a civil war within Islam.

Osama bin Laden wants to establish theocratic government in the Islamic world and so must overthrow what he perceives to be corrupt, secular states. The United States props up most of those regimes—in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.—either by military assistance or by stationing troops within their territory. Peña observes that in the Islamic tradition, all Muslims are supposed to help expel non-Muslims from Islamic territory. That is why fierce resistance has resulted from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and support of non-Islamic warlords in Somalia.

Somalia is a quintessential example of interventionist U.S. policy backfiring and having the opposite of the effect desired by American policymakers. The United States supported local Somali warlords against weak Islamic guerrillas. The Islamic militia then portrayed the warlords as lackeys of the United States and gained a much larger popular following. The Islamists then took over

terrorist attacks increased from 175 in 2003 to 625 in 2004—not counting terrorist attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. Rather than being part of the war on terrorism, the Iraq War seems to have bred retaliatory terror.

Peña criticizes President Bush's contrary view that the United States must fight terrorists in Iraq so that Americans don't have to fight them at home. He argues that the rash of major attacks in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom indicate that Islamist terrorists don't seem to be as bogged down in Iraq as the United States seems to be.

If anything, Peña's analysis may be a little timid in a few small ways. He goes out of his way to say people refuse to look at U.S. policies because they don't want to be accused of blaming America for 9/11. He states that this is understandable because nothing justifies those attacks, but that the reasons for rising Muslim hatred of the United States do

been very unusual in North America. This is a hard place for terrorists to operate because it is usually far away from their bases, making logistics issues challenging. In addition, as Peña does point out, Muslims in America are better integrated into society than those in Europe and so may be less likely to become radicalized and shelter terrorists or perpetrate terrorism. Thus, the absence of a statistically rare event doesn't necessarily mean much.

Finally, Peña correctly notes that before the U.S. government infringes on civil liberties in the name of fighting terrorism, it should demonstrate that the new governmental powers are essential, that they would be effective, and that there is no less invasive way to accomplish the security goal. Nevertheless, this standard is too low. Government actions must be constitutional, even if that is inconvenient. Many of the Bush administration's usurpations of civil liberties and expansions of executive powers after 9/11 are of questionable constitutionality. Even if one accepts that "there is a war on" against terrorism (even though this has not been formally declared), the Constitution is not suspended in wartime. In fact, during wartime, Americans need more assurance of their constitutional rights.

But these are small issues in an otherwise excellent counterproposal to the Bush administration's incompetent and disastrous war on terror. Peña convincingly, clearly, and concisely argues that an alternative program—intelligence, law enforcement, and limited military action to dismantle al-Qaeda; improvements in homeland security; and most important, a more restrained U.S. foreign policy to reduce the motivation for future anti-U.S. attacks—could reduce or eliminate the bull's eye that the Bush administration has painted on the backs of the American people. ■

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THE IRAQ WAR SEEMS TO HAVE BRED RETALIATORY TERROR.

Mogadishu, the capital, and may take over other key territory in Somalia, perhaps creating a future safe haven for terrorists who have a bone to pick with the United States. Of course, this does not mean that every nation with a weak government will become a haven for terrorists. In fact, the episode shows that the United States is so unpopular in the world that doing nothing would have been preferable to charging in and making more people mad. If the United States stays out of such failed states, any terrorist groups spawned there would have no reason to attack us, just as most groups on the State Department terrorism list don't.

Similarly, Peña implies that if the United States withdrew from Iraq, America would experience less anti-American terrorism worldwide. He notes that the Bush administration cancelled the State Department's annual report entitled "The Patterns of Global Terrorism" in 2004 because the number of "significant"

need to be explored. Peña might be better served by more boldly asserting that al-Qaeda—and not the victims or American society—should be blamed for the death and destruction of 9/11, but that the victims' government earned collateral culpability for endangering them with aggressive policies overseas that incited the hatred that motivated the attack. In other words, a greater distinction should be made between American society, which did not motivate the attacks, and the ill-conceived U.S. government policies that contributed significantly to the origin of the terrorism.

Peña dismisses the administration's boast that no major terrorist attack has occurred since 9/11 because of government security measures. He says that perhaps al-Qaeda hasn't chosen to attack. A stronger argument would be that regardless of government measures, catastrophic terrorism is a rare event. Historically, according to the State Department's statistics, terrorism has

It's Easy Being Green



So here at last is Taki's way to save the planet without pain. But before we begin, a warning: don't try doing it all at once. Melting glaciers,

violent hurricanes, flash floods, terrible droughts, the threat to polar bears in the shrinking Arctic Sea ice, and the real possibility of fires in the Amazon rainforest cannot be reversed overnight. Certainly not by turning off your engine at a traffic light, the way the wise Swiss people do. (Mind you, it helps.) The trick lies in small domestic savings and not listening to neocons. The unmentionables want us to believe that climate change is liberal propaganda, but unlike WMD in Iraq, climate change is real and very scary. Although Miami and Palm Beach are places I wouldn't visit even if I were sober, none of us would like to see them capsize under rising water. So here we go.

Lesson number one: we must keep the carbon dioxide emissions at present levels, which means dressing for the weather and turning down the heat five degrees, reducing CO₂ emissions by half a ton a year. It's simple common sense. Why lie around watching TV—which kills your brain and expands your waistline—wearing a bathing suit? Put on a sweater and presto, you have saved half a ton.

Lesson number two: turn off the television when you're not watching. By this I mean get off your seat and push the button. Don't click it off, turn it off. It is as simple as that.

Number three: use a gas oven.

Number four: buy local. Purchasing local vegetables saves miles of transport, and transporting goods produces emissions. Elementary, as a certain famous English detective used to say.

Lesson number five: change the way you drive. Never go above 60 miles per hour. It will not only save your life, it will

also help save the planet. Driving at 60 mph or below reduces emissions by 30 percent. Even better, drive a diesel. And while you're at it, force Detroit to become responsible. Gas addiction is an American macho disease. Hummers are for those who are penis-challenged. Hollywood types. As Thomas Friedman wrote, "The more Hummers we have on the road in America, the more military Hummers we will need in the Middle East." Hummers average 9 miles per gallon. This is why Toyota is worth \$199 billion and GM \$15 billion.

Lesson number six: force those bums in Washington to find carbon-free choices of power. Back nuclear power, however controversial it may sound or feel. It will cut down emissions by two thirds.

MASS PRODUCTION OF JUNK IS A **BIGGER THREAT THAN AL-QAEDA** AND TWICE AS DESTRUCTIVE.

Number seven: use solar and wind power. A rig off Norway traps carbon dioxide, turns it into liquid, and buries it in vast empty spaces beneath the earth's crust. Wind and solar power may be expensive, but not as expensive as the blood money we pay those camel drivers in Saudi Arabia who pass themselves off as princes while cornering the market in high-class hookers, mega yachts, private planes, and Las Vegas casino gambling.

Lesson number eight: think big, like the aforementioned Norway rig. Technology can work for us and can save our children's children.

Number nine: wake up and do your part. Every little bit helps, like encouraging tree planting. Next time a fast-talking real-estate developer comes near, plant one on his kisser and then plant a tree or anything green.


Lesson number ten: don't waste. Turn off a light in an empty room. I remember the first thing I noticed when I came to America was that no one—except my mother, that is—ever turned off a light. Insulate. Is there anything easier than insulation? It's cheaper, healthier, and helps save you know what.

In the past, we had an excuse. We did not know what we were doing to our planet. Now we do. We can easily reform this by following these simple steps. They are painless and do not change our way of life.

I drive in Switzerland, where drivers are heavily fined for excessive speed and for failing to turn their idling

engines off. Some foreigners complain. Too bad. Tiny Switzerland is doing her part. Do yours and you will one day be able to tell your grandchildren that you played a part in not dooming them. The purpose of human life is not only to make money and to have a bigger car than the next person. Mass production of junk is a bigger threat than al-Qaeda and twice as destructive. Think small, take your business to local, family-run businesses, try not to pollute. And don't forget to plant a right cross on real-estate sharks, neocons, and any corporate type who tries to tell you this is a left-wing conspiracy. ■

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